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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis 
of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The 
first paper models price competition in a decentralized whole­
sale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit 
auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the 
model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of 
generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is 
considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal 
cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The 
second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term 
contracts and price competition in the British electricity whole­
sale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to 
put downward pressure on spot market prices. A ‘strategic com­
mitment’ motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: 
a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the 
spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with 
its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior 
and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity 
auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than 
discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive 
efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other mar­
ket design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers’ bid 
functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are 
analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in 
the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular wc show that 
analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long 
as firms are restricted to  a finite number of bids.
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1 In troduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of elec­
tricity auctions written over, a period of twelve years from 1992 to  2004. 
The paper in Section 2, "Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity 
Industry", was written jointly with Nils-Henrik von der Fehr.1 It models 
price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a 
first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In this model, firms simultane­
ously submit, offer prices at which they are willing to  supply their capacities 
for each generating unit, units are ranked according to  their offer prices, 
demand is realized and the system marginal price determined by the by the 
offer price of the marginal operating unit. A key result is that pure-strategy 
equilibria do not always exist in the model. The reason is  basically the same 
as that in standard oligopoly models of capacity-constrained price competi­
tion. Since, when demand is sufficiently large, a firm is unable to serve the 
whole market at the competitive price, there is  an incentive to  bid above 
marginal cost and the competitive outcome cannot be an equilibrium. It 
can then be shown that for a range of demand distributions no other pure 
strategy combinations constitute an equilibrium either. In both the pure 
and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and 
inefficient despatch of generating units occur. We also consider an alterna­
tive regulatory pricing rule, and show that offering to  supply at marginal 
cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms, thereby securing 
efficient despatch.
The paper in Section 3 was previously entitled “Long-Term Contracts 
and Imperfectly Competitive Spot Markets: A Study of the UK Electricity 
Industry” and written jointly with Nils-Henrik von der Fehr.2 It analyses
l Tbe paper was o r ig in a lly  published as University of Osfo Department of Economies 
Memorandum No. 9, 1992. An abridged version was published in the Economic Journal 
in 1993, and reprinted in Paul L. Joskow and Michael Waterson (eds) Empirical Industrial 
Organization, Edward Elgar publishing Ltd, 2004; and in Ray Rees (ed) The Economics 
of Public Utilities, Edward Elgar publishing Ltd, (forthcoming 2005).
aIt was pubEshed as University o f Oslo Department o f Economics Memorandum No. 
14,1994.
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strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in 
the British electricity wholesale market. As in Section 2, the price mech­
anism is modelled as a first-price, sealed-bid auction, and we demonstrate 
that forward contracts, or "contracts for differences," will put a downward 
pressure on spot market prices. In addition, a ‘strategic commitment’ mo­
tive for selling a large number of contracts is identified: a generator may 
thereby commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order 
to  ensure that it will he despatched with its full capacity. In the resulting 
asymmetric equilibrium, the generator which has not contracted forward 
bids high in order to ensure high prices, but sells less output.
The paper in Section 4 was written jointly with Natalia Fabra and Nils- 
Henrik von der Fehr.3 Motivated by the introduction of a new auction format 
in the England and Wales electricity market, and the auction design debates 
in California, it characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uni­
form and discriminatory electricity auctions under a variety of assumptions 
concerning firms’ costs and capacities, demand elasticities, the auction bid 
format and the number of suppliers in the market. The aim was to  gain an 
improved understanding of how different auction formats affect the degree 
of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity markets. The 
uniform auction is outperformed in consumer surplus terms by the discrim­
inatory auction, but uniform auctions can be more efficient. The overall 
welfare ranking of the auctions is thus ambiguous. The paper also addresses 
some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. First, it 
demonstrates that the set of equilibrium outcomes in uniform and discrimi­
natory auctions is essentially independent of the number of admissible steps 
in suppliers’ offer-price functions, so as long as th is number is  finite. Tins 
reduces the complexity involved in the analysis of multi-unit auctions. Sec­
ond, we demonstrate that the ‘implicitly collusive’ equilibria found in the
3 The paper will appear in the Rand Journal of Economics in 2006- under the title 
"Designing Electricity Auctions." An earlier version of the paper, entitled "Designing 
Electricity Auctions: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vidaey," was presented to the iD E l’s 
Conference on "Wholesale Markets for Electricity," University o f Toulouse, 22-23 Novem­
ber 2002.
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uniform auction when offer prices are infinitely divisible are unique to this 
formulation of the auction (i.e. to share auctions), and do not arise when 
offer-price functions are discrete. Hence the concerns expressed in the lit­
erature that uniform auctions may lead to ‘collusive-like’ outcomes even in 
potentially competitive periods when there is  considerable excess capacity, 
are likely misplaced.
When we first began to  study the new electricity market introduced in 
England and Wales in 1990, it was not widely understood that this market 
was a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction and thus could be analyzed 
using tools from auction theory. The early literature tended to use tradi­
tional models from IO theory to  describe th is market,4 and a major part 
of the purpose of our 1992/3 paper was simply to model the market rules 
as they were given to us, albeit in admittedly long and near-impenetrable 
documents produced by the then National Grid Company. Although some 
researchers have continued to make use of Cournot or other standard IO 
models for this purpose, by the late 199GJs it was no longer possible to  
dispute the intim ate connection between decentralized electricity wholesale 
markets and auction theory. As Paul Klemperer noted in 2001, "von der 
Fehr and Harbord were seen as rather novel in pointing out that the new 
electricity markets could be viewed as auctions. Now, however, it is unecxn- 
troversial that these markets are best understood through auction theory, 
and electricity market design has become the province of leading auction 
theorists.”5
That decentralized electricity wholesale markets are auctions, and hence 
best understood through auction theory, became so well accepted that much 
of the debate in Britain in the late 1990’s concerning the reform of the elec­
tricity trading arrangements focused on the merits and demerits of different 
auction formats.6 The analysis in Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2004)
'‘‘As described in Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), Chapter 9, for example.
“Klemperer (2001).
4 Harbord and McCoy (2000), Klemperer (2002) and Wolfram (1009) contain discussions
of this debate. See also Kahn et. al. (2001) for an account of a similar debate that took
place in California.
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(in Section 4 of this thesis) was at least partly motivated by a perceived 
need to  have rigorous and tractable economic models which would permit a 
comparison of market performance under different auction rules in light of 
this debate.
If controversy remains, it is now confined to  the type of auction theory 
to be applied to these markets. Since 1992 there have been two leading con­
tenders. The discrete, multi-unit auction approach taken in our own papers, 
and the continuous auction approach of Wilson (1979) and Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989), originally adopted in Green and Newbery (1992). The contin­
uous auction, or "supply function," approach was initially popular and has 
recently been taken up again by Holmberg (2005) and W ilson (2005). We 
have commented extensively on the distinction to be drawn between these 
two approaches in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Fabra, von der 
Fehr and Harbord (2004), and in the methodological essay Fabra, von der 
Fehr and Harbord (2002). Our basic result, that discrete or finite bid func­
tions largely eliminate the collusive equilibrium problem which characterizes 
continuous auction models was first reported in von der Fehr and Harbord 
(1993), and extended and elaborated on in Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord 
(2004). This result was subsequently discovered independently by Kremcr 
and Nyborg (2004).
In 1993 when our first paper in this area was published, there were 
almost no other papers available on this topic.7 Now a bibliography of 
articles on electricity auctions freon around the world would number in the 
hundreds, if not thousands.8 I have therefore made no attem pt to revise our 
earlier papers to  take account of this ever-expanding literature. The paper 
in Section 4 to  a large degree updates and extends the analysis presented in 
Section 2 in any event, and relatively little further progress has been made
7The notable exception was Green and Newbery (1992).
8According to  "Google Scholar," our 1993 Economic Journal paper has been cited in 
well over 100 subsequent articles, but there are many notable omissions from the list, and 
these are just the analyses which cite our 1993 paper. Our early survey paper (von der 
Fehr and Harbord, 1998) cited over 99 academic articles, excluding reports and documents 
published by regulatory authorities.
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in the analysis of electricity contract markets which is the subject of the 
paper in Section 3.
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2 Spot M arket C om p etition  in  th e  U K  E lectricity  
Industry
2 .1  Introduction
At the core of the recently deregulated and privatized UK electricity industry 
is the wholesale spot market.9 Before each period that the market is open, 
the generating companies (the generators) submit minimum prices at which 
they are wffiing to  supply power. On the basis of these “offer prices”, the 
National Grid Company, which plays a central role as coordinator and is 
responsible for running the transmission grid, draws up a least-cost plan 
of generating units for despatch in the next period- This “rank order” y 
together with demand, determines which units will actually be despatched. 
Payments to supplying units, or ’sets’, are based on a “system marginal 
price” determined as the offer price of the marginal operating unit in every 
period.
The particular organization of the electricity spot market makes standard 
oligopoly models inadequate as analytical tools- We propose instead to  
model this market as a scalcd-bid multiplo-unit auction. In the first stage of 
the model, firms simultaneously submit offer prices at which they axe willing 
to supply their (given) capacities. As in the UK industry, firms (generators) 
can submit different offer prices for each individual plant or generating set, 
i.e. firms offer step-supply functions. Sets are then ranked according to their 
offer prices (i.e- a supply function is constructed). In the final stage, demand 
is realized and the system marginal price is determined by the intersection 
of demand and supply, that is by the offer price of the marginal operating 
unit-
It turns out that pure-strategy equilibria do not always exist in such a 
model. The reason is basically the same as that in standard oligopoly models 
of capacity constrained price competition (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1986). 
Since, when demand is sufficiently large, a firm is unable to serve the whole
9For details on the UK electricity industry, new and old, see Vickers and Yarrow (1991), 
Green (1991) and Janies Capel & Co.(1990).
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market at the competitive price, there is an incentive to  raise bids above 
marginal cost, and thus, the competitive outcome cannot he an equilibrium. 
It can then be shown that for a range of demand distributions no other pure 
strategy combinations constitute an equilibrium either. We believe that this 
result does not necessarily reflect an inadequacy of our modelling approach, 
but rather suggests that there is an inherent price instability in the present 
regulatory set up. Indeed, empirical evidence would seem to confirm that 
experimentation and abrupt changes in pricing strategies is a feature of the 
new industry.
This particular result (the nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies) 
also casts some doubt on the relevance of the model analyzed by Richard 
Green and David Newbery (1992) (see also Bolle, 1990 and Newbery, 1991). 
These authors argue that the "step-length", i.e. the size of individual gen­
erating sets, is small enough to  justify approximating the step-supply sched­
ules by smooth (i.e. continuously differentiable) functions, thus applying 
the supply function framework developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). 
As we demonstrate however, the particular types of equilibria they derive 
do not generalize to a model where sets are of positive size.
Although theirs is a seemingly very useful contribution, it remains "an 
open question whether the bidding strategies of the firms will differ signif­
icantly if they are forced to provide a step function, or whether they are 
allowed to  provide a smooth schedule" (Green and Nerwbery, 1992, footnote 
2).ifl
Nevertheless the most important result, inefficient pricing, turns out 
to  be robust to alternative forms of modelling. Indeed, we find an even 
stronger tendency than Green and Newbery towards above marginal-cost 
pricing. Thus the conjecture that the Bertrand outcome is unlikely in the 
present institutional set-up of the UK electricity industry, even if there is no 
collusive behavior, seems, to be strongly supported. In addition, our model
10 Green and Newbery also assume downward sloping demand curves, whereas com­
pletely inelastic demand would seem to be more appropriate for the UK industry. Bolle 
(1990) proves that in the latter case, no equilibrium exists in the supply function model.
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suggests that high-cost sets may be bid in at lower offer prices than lower - 
cost sets and thus be despatched before these more efficient units. Hence 
despatching may be inefficient in the sense that overall economic generation 
costs are not minimized.
An important advantage of our framework is. that it makes it possible 
to model explicitly the role of the grid company (the auctioneer), and then 
use insights from the auction literature to study the effects of different pric­
ing rules7 i_e. the rules determining the prices paid to different supplying 
units. With a pricing rule like the one used in the present UK electricity 
industry, the game corresponds to a first-price sealed-bid auction. However, 
by letting the system marginal price be determined by the offer price of 
one of the marginal non-operating sets, the game corresponds to a (general­
ized) second-price sealed-bid auction, and in this case offering to supply at 
marginal cost can be shown to  be a dominant strategy fear each firm. This 
result is in accord with what is typically found in the literature on optimal 
auctions where it is well known that second-price (or Vickrey) auctions lead 
to higher revenues for the auctioneer than do first-price auctions (Myerson, 
1981, or Maskin and Riley, 1989).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Our auction model 
of the UJK. electricity spot market is presented in Section 2J2 and then 
analyzed in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we consider an alternative regulatory 
pricing rule. Section 2.5 contains a short summary and conclusions.
2.2 The M odel
Before the actual opening of the market, N  independent firms simultane­
ously submit offer prices at which they are willing to  supply electricity from 
each of their generating units, or sets. On the basis of these bids, the mar­
ket organizer ( or ‘auctioneer’) draws up a ranking of units, i.e. a market 
supply curve is constructed. When the market opens, demand is determined 
as a random variable independent of price, and the auctioneer, by calling 
suppliers into operation, equates demand and supply. Operating units, i.e.
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units actually supplying output, are paid the system marginal price which 
is equal to the offer price of the marginal operating unit.
It is assumed that generators have constant marginal costs, Cn >  0, n =  
1,2,...,JV, at production levels below capacity, while production above ca­
pacity is impossible. We let the. index n rank firms according to  their 
marginal costs, i.e. Cn < Cn-bi- The total capacity of generator n is given by 
kjt, n — 1 ,2 , . . . ,  N . The capacity of generator n consists of m,, sets, where 
k„i is the capacity of the i ’th set, i  =  1 ,2 ,—,m n, and kni — kn. M  
denotes the total number of sets, i.e., M  — ^ 7 % . Generators can submit 
different bids for each of their sets. If two or more sets (of any firm) are 
offered at tire same price, they are equally likely to he called into operation.
We consider a game G  with N  4-1 players: N  suppliers and Nature. The 
move order is as follows:
S tage 1: The suppliers simultaneously submit offer prices, pni <
p ,i  — 1,2, ...,mn,n  =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  N  at which they are willing to supply elec­
tricity from each of their generating units.
S tage 2: Sets are ranked according to their bids such that if the bad
of the set with rank r is pr and that of the set with rank r  is pr and pr <  pf 
then r  < r. If m  sets are offered at the same price p, then these sets are 
designated numbers r, r-f-1, . . . ,r + m  - 1, with (marginal) probabilities 1/m , 
for some r G {1,2,..., M  — m  -f 1}.
S tage 3: Nature chooses demand d €  [d, d] C [0, if] , K  =  ]Pn kn
according to  some probability distribution G(d). The auctioneer, by calling 
suppliers into operation, equates demand and supply. Despatched units 
are paid the market-clearing price, which is equal to  the offer price of the 
marginal operating unit.11
Note that to  assume d £ [0, K] is without loss of generality since 
supply is limited to K  and thus demand will have to be rationed if it increases
11 More precisely, let Kg — & and K r =  k \ r  — 1 ,2 ,..., M  where kr is the capacity 
of the set with rank r. Let p  =  m ax{r | K r- i <  d}.Then all sets with rank r =  1 , 2 , p — I 
get paid ppkr while set p  gets pP[d — Kp— i]. Let sn be the actual supply of firm n, i.e. 
&n — 23r=l Sn(r )kr 4* — K p—i], where £«{r) is 1 if the set with rank r belongs to
firm n, and zero otherwise. The payoff to  firm n  is then sn\pp — Cn].
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beyond K . In particular, G(d) will typically have an atom at d — K , 
reflecting the fact that rationing may occur with positive probability. In 
addition, the present U.K. electricity supply industry is characterized by 
significant excess capacity, and this is likely to remain true for the foreseeable 
future- Hence d <  K  would appear to  he the relevant case-
All players are assumed to be risk neutral and hence aim to maximize 
their expected payoff in the game. All aspects of the game, as well as the 
players’ marginal costs and capacities and the probability distribution G{d}, 
axe assumed to be common knowledge.
Firms’ offer prices are constrained to be below some threshold level p < 
oo, since otherwise, in cases when there is a positive probability that all 
sets will be called into operation, expected payoffs could be made infinitely 
large. A natural interpretation of p  is that it is a regulated maximum price, 
either officially, or as perceived by the generators (i.e. firms believe that the 
regulatory authorities will effectuate price regulation if the price rises above 
p).12 An alternative interpretation is that p  is a reservation price, below 
which demand is completely inelastic.
The model may be interpreted as a first-price, sealed-bid, multiple-unit 
auction with a random number of units in which all units are sold simul­
taneously (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; , Hausch, 1986)- It is ‘sealed-bid’ 
because of the simultaneous move structure and ‘first-price’ in the sense that 
the market price is determined by the marginal successful supplier. This in­
terpretation is  particularly convenient for analyzing alternative pricing rules.
2.3 A nalysis
In this section we characterize the Nash equilibria of the model presented in 
Section 2.2. Most of the discussion will centre on the duopoly case, for which 
we are able to  derive explicit results. Apart from being the relevant case 
for the UK electricity industry, explicit formulae for optimal strategies are 
difficult to derive in the more general oligopoly case. Hence our discussion
12In the England and Wakes pool, system marginal price cannot exceed the value of lost 
load (approx. £2 per kWh).
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of oligopoly in this section is in most cases limited to pointing out where 
and how the duopoly results generalize.
Before discussing particular equilibrium outcomes, we present a basic 
result characterizing the types of pure-stratcgy equilibria that can occur in 
the model.
P rop osition  2.1 In a purr,-strategy equilibrium (generically) at 
most one generator will determine system marginal price with positive prob­
ability.
Rem ark: By gencricity is hero meant that firms have different marginal 
costs. If firms have identical marginal costa there may exist Bertrand-type 
equilibria where firms submit offer prices equal to the marginal costs of 
each set, and in which more than one firm owns sets which with positive 
probability may become the marginal operating unit.
The intuition underlying Proposition 2.1 is straightforward. A player 
which owns a set that has a positive probability of becoming the marginal 
operating unit, will always want to  increase the bid of that set by some 
small amount towards the next higher bid, since that does not affect the 
ranking, but increases the generator’s payoff in the event that this is the 
marginal set. On the other hand, it cannot be optimal to submit a bid 
equal to or just above that of a set of another player, since as long as the 
bid is above marginal cost (which it will be) profits can be increased by 
undercutting the rival slightly, thereby increasing the probability of being 
called into operation, without significantly reducing the price received in 
any state. These two opposing forces destroy any candidate for a pure- 
strategy equilibrium in which two or more generators both have sets which 
with positive probability will become the marginal operating unit.
Proposition 2.1 implies that the types of pure-strategy equilibria that 
may exist are very restricted and, furthermore, it  rules out the existence of 
puro-stratcgy equilibria for a wide range of demand distributions. From this 
it follows that the types of equilibria found by Green and Newbery (1992)
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in their model, do not generalize to the case where individual generating 
seta axe of positive size. The reason that auch equilibria exist in the aupply 
function framework is that when individual sets are of size zero (the cost 
and supply functions are continuously differentiable everywhere), the effect 
on the system  marginal price from a bid of any individual set is negligible, 
and thus the first part of the above argument does not apply.
Below we consider circumstances under which pure-strategy equilibria 
will exist, as well as presenting examples of mixed-strategy equilibria when 
pure-strategy equilibria are non-existent. The existence, multiplicity and 
the type of equilibria will be seen to depend crucially on the support of the 
demand distribution. We therefore distinguish between three cases; ‘low- 
dcmand periods’ in which a single generator can supply the whole of demand; 
‘high-demand periods’ in which neither generator has sufficient capacity to  
supply the entire market; and ‘variable-demand periods’ in which there is 
positive probability for both the event that a single generator can supply 
the whole of demand, and the event that both generators will have to be 
called into operation, irrespective of their bads.
2.3.1 Low-demand periods
This case corresponds to the standard Bertrand model of oligopoly in 
the sense that there is a unique equilibrium in which both generators offer to 
supply at a price equal to  the marginal cost of the least efficient generator:
P rop osition  2 .2  If P r(d  <  m in {k i,k 2} )  =  1> there exist pure- 
strategy equilibria, in all of which the market clearing price equals the marginal 
cost of the least efficient generator, c%, and only generator 1 produces.13
R em ark: When k± >  £2 , such equilibria continue to  exist when P r{d  <  
fcj) =  I, but other equilibria may exist also (see the next section).
13 To avoid non-existence, we impose the tie-breaking rule that firm 1 is called into 
operation with probability 1 whenever the firms’ offer prices tie at This captures 
the idea that the most efficient firm marginally underbids its rival, while simplifying the 
description of the- equilibrium.
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The argument in the proof is identical to that of the standard Bertrand 
model. Since, with probability 1, demand can be met by a single genera­
tor, there will be competition to become the single operating generator^ In 
particular, a generator will always undercut its rival so long as its rival’s 
bids are above its own marginal costs. Thus any equilibrium must have the 
most efficient generator (generator 1) submitting offer prices for a capacity 
sufficient to  meet demand, at or below the marginal cost of the least effi­
cient generator. Since in this range, generator 1’s profit is increasing in its  
own offer price, these bids must equal C2 - We conclude that in low-demand 
periods, the system margined price is bounded above by the marginal costs 
of the less efficient generator.14
2.3.2 High-demand periods
We now consider the case when, with probability 1, both generators will 
be called into operation. Since the high-pricing generator will be operating 
for sure, and in equilibrium generators never submit equal bids (see Propo­
sition 2.1), its  profit will be increasing in its  own offer price. Thus, the 
extreme opposite to the result of the previous section holds; whereas in low- 
demand periods the system marginal price equals the marginal cost of the 
least efficient generator, in high-demand periods it always equals the highest 
admissible price.
P rop osition  2 .3  If P r(d  >  m ax{kik 2 })  =  1, all pure-strategy equi­
libria are given by gffer-price pairs (p i, satisfying either p\ =  p  and 
P2  <  62 or P2 =  p  and pi <  b±, for some bi <  p,i — 1 , 2 .
Rem ark: If ki >  ^ 2  (&2 >  ki), then all (pi,P2 ) such that pi =  p  and 
P2  — p  and pi <  bi) continue to  be equilibria for all G(-) such that
P r{d  >  k2 ) — 1 (P r(d  >  fci) =  1). That is, a sufficient condition for the
14 A similar result can be shown to hold in the oligopoly model. If, with probability 1, 
demand is less than the total capacity of the n most efficient generators (n <  N ), then in 
an equilibrium system marginal price cannot exceed the marginal cost of the n + lst most 
efficient generator.
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existence of this type of equilibrium is that, with probability one, demand 
is greater than the capacity of the smaller firm.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. The high-bidding gen­
erator will always determine the system marginal price by Proposition 2.1. 
Therefore its payoff is increasing in its  own offer prices and profit maximiza­
tion requires bidding at the highest admissible price. The low-bidding gen­
erator is indifferent between offer prices lower than that of the high-bidding 
generator. However, to  ensure that the high-bidding generator does not 
deviate, the low-bidding generator has to bid low enough so that the high- 
bidding generator’s payoff from undercutting is less than the payoff earned 
in equilibrium. Thus the upper bound on the law-bidding generator’s  offer 
price.
In all of the equilibria characterized by Proposition 2.3, the system  
marginal price equals the highest admissible price. The low-bidding genera­
tor is despatched with full capacity while the high-bidding generator supplies 
the residual demand. It follows that both generators prefer equilibria where 
they act as the low-bidding generator, since the received price is the same 
while a generator’s output is greater in the equilibrium in which it is ranked 
first.
Note that some of these equilibria involve inefficient despatch: the high- 
cost generator may be the generator with the lowest bid and thus will be 
despatched with its total capacity, while the low cost generator is only 
despatched with part of its capacity. In such equilibria, generation costs 
arc not minimized.15
2.3.3 Variable-demand periods
We turn now to  the third case in which either generator may set system  
marginal price with positive probability independently of its bid (i.e. rank). 
In the England and Wales pool generators bid daily, and (depending on the
15It is easy to. see that in the oligopoly case we get a corresponding result. Whenever 
demand is such that the highest-bidding generator determines the system marginal price 
with probability 1, any vector of offer prices such that the highest-pricing generator sub­
m its the maximum admissible price, while the rest bid sufficiently below this, will be an 
equilibrium
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season) their bids may consequently be constant for tim e periods in which 
demand is expected to  be high (morning and afternoon) and periods in which 
it will be low (night tim e).16 This can be modelled as if the generators face 
a angle period in which demand could be low or high with some probability.
It turns, out that pure strategy equilibria do not exist in this case and 
hence equilibria are in ‘mixed strategies,’ Under their mixed strategies, in 
equilibrium both generators randomize over their price bids from an interval 
bounded below by the least efficient generator’s marginal costs, and above 
by the highest admissible price. Expected prices still exceed the marginal 
costs of generation, however what the market price will be is the result of a 
random process and cannot be predicted exactly.
The non-cxistcncc of puro-stratcgy equilibria follows from observing that 
bid pairs like those in Proposition 2.3 cannot constitute equilibria in this case 
since the low-bidding generator will now always wish to  increase its bid; in 
doing so it thereby increases the system marginal price in the event that it 
becomes the marginal operating generator. We therefore have the following 
result:
P rop osition  2.4  If d —d >  where [rf,tf] is the support
of the demand distribution G(d), then there does not exist an eqmUbrivm in 
pure strategies.
This result follows directly from Proposition 2.1. Since the range of 
possible demand distributions exceeds the capacity of the largest generator, 
it follows that for any strategy combination there is a positive probability 
that sets of either generator will be the marginal operating unit. We can 
then apply the result of Proposition 2-1; there cannot exist pure-strategy 
equilibria for which more than one generator has a positive probability of 
determining the system marginal price.
Characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria in the general model is
16 This is  different in  the Scandinavian pool, in  which different price bids may be sub­
m itted for each o f the 24 hourly periods that the market is open. The variable-demand 
case is consequently of less relevance for this market.
21
cumbersome, and in the remainder of this section we consider a simple exam­
ple. In the example, it is assumed that for all n, mn =  1, i.e. each generator 
owns only one set, or can submit only one offer price for the whole of its 
capacity, and we characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria for the duopoly 
case.17 We are able to  show that there exists a unique mixed-strategy equi­
librium, and we derive the explicit form of the two players’ strategies. In 
particular, we find that the lowest price in the support of the players’ strate­
gies is  strictly greater than the marginal cost of the least efficient generator, 
and that this lowest price is an increasing function both of the highest possi­
ble price p, the probability that both firms will be operating (i.e. demand), 
and the marginal cost of the least efficient generator.
The analysis is considerably simplified by restricting attention to the fol­
lowing special case: All firms are assumed to have equal capacities normal­
ized to  1, and demand is discrete and distributed on {1,2} with probabilities 
7rn =  P r(d  =  n ),n  =  1,2, with Pr{d  =  n) >  0 and =  1. Since the
main results carry over to the more general model, we concentrate on this 
special case.
Assume N  =  2 and define 7Tj =  n . W ithout loss of generality, normalizo 
ci, to zero and let C2 ~  c. The assumption on the support of the demand 
distribution in Proposition 2.4 now corresponds to the case where 0 <  tt <  1, 
i.e. the events that one and two generators are called into operation both 
occur with positive probability. Define:
f Inle  • when 7r =  4
Fi (p ) =  { (2-1)
( M® ' infT-ilc)' whcn P <  P and » =  jiiel ^  +  whe“  p  <  P  t4 s  (2-2>1, when p  =  p
7Twhere ct(7r) =  [------- ]27r- f1 —7r
17 Analyses of mixed strategies in models with a similar structure to the model presented 
here can be found in Shilony (1977), Varian (1980), and Padilla (1992). See Brandenburger 
(1992) for a discussion of the interpretation o f mixed-strategy equilibria as equilibria in  
beliefs.
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where ln(e) =  1. W e can then prove the following result.
P rop osition  2 .5  There exists a unique mixed-strategy Nash equi­
librium in which player i ’s strategy is to play pe\pm,p] according to the 
probability distribution Fi(p),i =  1,2, where F{(j>) are given by (2.1) and 
(2.2) and pm >  0 is given by (2.3). Further, Fi{p) >  F^ip).
In equilibrium, players strike a balance between two opposing effects. 
On the one hand a high bid results in a high system marginal price - and 
hence payoff - in the event that the generator is marginal. On the other 
hand, bidding high reduces the probability of being despatched. The latter 
effect is less important the smaller is rr, since then it is  very likely that both 
generators will be despatched. Conversely, when the probability that both 
generators will be operating is low (i.e. tt is large), less probability mass is 
placed on higher prices. To say this another way, the incentive to  raise one’s  
bid is checked by the likelihood of ending up as the higher pricing generator 
and not being called into operation: when 7r is small, there is a substantial 
probability that a generator will be operating even if it offers to  supply only 
at a very high price. Thus, for small tt both generators will tend to  submit 
high bids and visa versa. Indeed, the following is easily demonstrated:
(2.4)
lim pm -  p. (2.5)
71—>0
Note that the limit in (2.4) corresponds to the case discussed in the 
‘low-demand periods’ subsection, while the limit in (2.5) corresponds to the 
‘high-demand’ case.
The high-cost generator’s strategy profile first-order stochastically dom­
inates the strategy profile of the low-cost generator (i.e. F2 (p) <  Fi (p)).
lim pm =  c,
7T—► !
Thus in expected terms, the high-cost generator will submit higher bids 
than the low-cost generator, A lower hound for the probability that the 
high-cost generator submits a bid below that of the low-cost generator can 
be established by considering the probability that p 2 < p i ~ c .  When 7r =  
this reduces to
Pr(p2 < Pi -  ca) =  i  [1 -  ln(l +  —^-r)]2 (2,6)i  a  — 1
where a  =  p /c. If a  =  5(10), i.e. p  is 5 (10) tim es the marginal cost of 
the high-cost generator, tins probability equals 12% (27%). Thus, although 
the typical outcome is that the high-cost generator prices above the low- 
cost generator, there is a potentially significant positive probability that 
the high-cost generator submits the lowest price offer and thus becomes the 
only operating generator. Therefore we may conclude that, as in the high- 
dernand periods case discussed above, the regulatory rule, as it is modelled 
here, is not ex-post efficient (we discuss below haw the rule may be adjusted 
to ensure efficient despatch).
We may use this model to consider the question of how an increase 
in the number of independent generators will effect (average) pool prices, 
by briefly extending the analysis here to the oligopoly model (i.e. N  >  
2). In order to do so we assume that firms have equal marginal costs and 
without further loss of generality, these are normalized to zero. We consider 
a symmetric model since this is the only case in which it is possible to 
characterize equilibria in any detail. We continue to assume that there 
is a positive probability that all units will be called into operation, i.e. 
7Tjv >  0, since otherwise, given the symmetry assumption, only the perfectly 
competitive outcome would be passible. We then obtain the following result:
P rop osition  2 .6  Assume Cn =  0 ,n  — 1 ,...i\T. Then there exists 
a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium far the game in which each 
player plays prices p e fpm,p] according to the probability distribution F(p) 
where F(p) is the solution to:
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r w “ S j T O s n (P iF (p ) )>  {27)
and
“ (?) - E i l l  * i i ( i -  i;JV- t ,q)  . ,
m = l £ ^ n B t ( i ; N - l , q) KA'S>
In (2.8), b(i;N, q) is the density function of the binomial probability 
distribution with parameters N  and q, B ( i ]N ,q ) is one minus the corre­
sponding cumulative binomial probability distribution, and =  dBfdq~ 
Furthermore, F(pm) — 0, F(p) — 1, and pm >  0.
From the uniqueness of the solution to  (2.7) and (2.8), it follows that pm 
is decreasing in p  . Note that B q(i] N  — 1, q} is always decreasing in i for 
sufficiently small q. For larger q,Bq( i ;N  — 1 ,q) is increasing (decreasing) 
in i for small (large) i, b(i — 1; N  — 1, q), as a function of i, is shaped as 
an inverse V. Thus, reducing ft* for small i  and increasing 2T* for larger a, 
typically increases fi(p, F(p)) for given p. Therefore one would expect that 
pm is larger the more probability weight there are on pi for large i ’s. We 
have the following lim iting results;
lim pm =  0 (2.9)
n\ —*1
lim pm =  p  (2.10)
nN~* 1
The question of particular interest here is how the number of suppliers in 
the market will affect the price structure- There are in general two different
ways of analyzing this. We could either think of a situation where, for a
given level of demand, additional firms are introduced into the market, i.e. 
total capacity is increased, or a situation in which existing firms are split 
up into smaller units, i.e. a given total capacity is divided between a larger 
number of firms. If the question of primary interest is the organization of 
the deregulated structure of an existing industry, the latter approach seems
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the most natural and this is what will be considered here. We analyze a 
particular example, where n* — 1 /N r hy comparing the outcome for different 
TV’s. By substituting for pi and solving (2.7), we obtain the following:
R esu lt: When Vn, Cn — 0, and Vi, =  1 /JV,
m  =  — -  lnfe" - 1  -  p ), (2 .1 1 )
pm — p — e1_iV, and 
E p  =  ~ [ I  ~ e 1 ” " 1
Thus, both pm and Ep  are decreasing in N . That is, prices will tend 
to  be lower on average in a more fragmented industry- The intuition for 
this may be explained as follows: By increasing its offer price a generator 
reduces the probability that it will receive a positive payoff. On the other 
hand, submitting a high offer price increases, in expected terms, the system  
marginal price. The system marginal price effect, however, benefits the 
generator only when it happens to be the marginal generator, an event 
winch is less likely the more firms there are in the industry.
This intuition also suggests that in the more general model with multi­
unit firms, prices will tend to be higher than in the model in which these 
same units act independently. As indicated above, raising the offer price of 
one unit will have an external effect on other units in that it increases the 
expected system marginal price. A generator which controls many units will 
internalize part of tins externality and will thus have an additional incentive 
to increase its offer prices. In particular, this "coordination incentive" is 
stronger the more units an owner controls. It therefore seems reasonable 
to  conclude that for a given number of generating sets in the industry, the 
system marginal price will be a decreasing function of the number of owners, 
or generators controlling the sets, i.e. the industry concentration ratio.
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2.4 An A lternative Payoff Rule
As we have shown in Section 2.3, firms will in general choose bids greater 
than their marginal costs, and thus the system marginal price will tend to  
exceed the marginal costs of each of the operating units. Furthermore, since 
less efficient sets may submit lower offer prices than more efficient sets, ineffi­
cient despatching may result. It is therefore an interesting question whether 
the regulatory rule can be modified so as to  induce truthful revelation of 
costs and, as a result, efficient despatching. In this section we show that 
by extending an insight on optimal auctions due to Vickrey (1961), such a 
modification is indeed possible.
The electricity market game G may be interpreted as a first-price, sealed- 
bid, multiple-unit auction with a random number of units. In particular, 
the system marginal price is determined by the offer price of the marginal 
operating set, and thus a firm’s bids will determine the price received in the 
event that one of its  sets is the marginal operating unit. The fundamental 
insight of Vickrey (1961) was that by making the price received by a firm 
independent of its own offer price, marginal cost pricing can be induced as a 
dominant strategy far all firms. The. reason for this is that in such a set-up 
a firm can only influence its own payoff to  the extent that it affects the 
probability of being called into operation. A firm will prefer to be operating 
for all realizations of demand such that its  payoff is positive, and will prefer 
not to  operate whenever its payoff is negative. Therefore, offering to  supply 
at a price equal to marginal cost becomes a dominant strategy because it 
maximizes the probability of being called into operation whenever the firm’s  
payoff is expected to be non-negative.
In a standard Vickrey auction, price is determined by the marginal un­
successful, i.e. non-operating, player. To generalize tins result, we must 
construct a mechanism which is both incentive compatible and individually 
rational. This can be done by letting the price paid to  firm n  be determined 
by the intersection of demand with the residual (ue. net of the capacity 
of firm n) supply curve. Consider therefore a slight variation of the game
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analyzed in Section 2.3 above where the only change involves the payoff rule: 
the intersection of the demand and the supply curves determines which units 
will be called into operation. All operating units arc paid firm-spccific prices 
determined by the intersection of the demand and the respective residual 
supply curves if such an intersection exists7 and set equal to p  >  max{cn} 
otherwise. Call this game G. Then the following result holds:
P rop osition  2 .7  The game G has a unique dominant strategy equi­
librium in which p ni =  c^, re — 1,2, ..., N
R em ark: Other Nash equilibria typically exist. However, since offering 
to  supply at marginal cost (weakly) dominates all other strategies,, we con­
sider this the natural ‘focal’ point, and thus base our discussion solely on 
this equifibrium.
In G t as opposed to G, despatch is efficient since Erma are always despatched 
in order of increasing marginal cost. Thus, our alternative regulatory rule 
leads to minimization of real generation costs. 18
In addition to  technical efficiency, one might ask how total (expected) 
payments to the generators compare in the two auctions. Denote by E C  
total expected payments in G, and by E C  total expected payments in G, 
respectively. It is easy to  verify that revenue equivalence holds when valu­
ations are drawn from the same distribution (if we let p =  p) as we would 
expect from the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem (Vickrey 1961; McAfee and 
McMillan 1937). For example, in the symmetric oligopoly model considered 
in Section 2.3, E C  — (since players receive the same payoff whichever
of the prices in the support of their strategies they play, and, in particular, 
the profit from playing p  is ?r/vp). On the other hand, E C  ~  Nnjyp  (since 
payments are zero when some firms do not operate and p  to each of the N  
firms otherwise). It turns out to be difficult to establish the sign of E C —E C
^Efficiency considerations in electricity supply industries are complicated considerably 
by the network characteristics of such industries, and being able to rank generating units 
according to  production costs is only a necessary condition for short-run efficiency. For a 
treatment of efficiency and optimal pricing in electrical networks, see Bohn, Caramanis, 
and Sehweppe (1984).
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in the general model. However, in the duopoly case one can show that E C  
is never smaller than JSC.This is obvious in the cases discussed in sections 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2. In the case analyzed in section 2.3.3, E C  can be found by 
considering and <f>i(p) as p  —> p, where <^(p) is the profit of firm i from 
playing p, i =  1,2, from winch it follows that EC—n K c +  [1 — n\2p, where
K  =
and
+  S+P=ij)’ w h em r= J
Pa  =  a #  
c =  [ — I1 — 7T J
and E C  =  ire -4- [1 — 7r]2p . Now, K  >  1, and K  =  1 when a  — 1 and is 
increasing in a. For gfven a , K  is maximized at tt =  1 /2  and K  <  e  — 1. 
We summarize the duopoly result in the following proposition:
P rop osition  2 .8  When N  =  2, E C  is a lower bound for EC .
Such an improved pricing performance echoes the result in the optimal- 
auction literature that second-price sealed-btd auctions yield higher payoffs 
to the auctioneer than do first-price scalcd-bid auctions (McAfee and McMil­
lan, 1987; Myerson, 1981; and Maskin and Riley, 1989). Thus, some of the 
first-price/ second-price comparison results found in the auction literature 
extend to this setting as well.
Wc conclude that (disregarding collusion and long-term contracts) an in­
stitutional set-up which induces firms to  make offer prices equal to  marginal 
costs is perfectly possible even when firms axe capacity-constrained, some­
thing which seems not to have been appreciated in the literature. As such, 
it also shows that applying results from standard oligopoly models (such as 
those found in for example Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983 and Tirole, 1988, 
ch. 5) can be misleading as a description of the outcome of competition in 
the U.K. electricity market.
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2.5 C onclusion
In this paper price competition in the deregulated wholesale market for elec­
tricity for England and Wales has been analyzed as a first-price,, sealed-bidr 
multiple unit auction. In doing so, we have demonstrated that under the 
existing institutional set-up there is likely to be both inefficient despatch­
ing and above marginal cost pricing, even in the absence of collusion and 
long term contracts. While these points have been argued elsewhere (see 
for instance, Vickers and Yarrow,1991 or Green,1991), the arguments have 
been largely informal and usually based upon standard models of oligopoly 
pricing, and hence somewhat inconclusive. A major purpose of the present 
paper has been to address these issues in a formal model specifically de­
signed to  capture the essential dements of new electricity pricing system in 
the United Kingdom.
Green and Newbery (1992) is the only other model specifically designed 
to  study the bidding behavior of the generators under the new UK system . 19 
W hile the conclusions from the two models concur in many respects, our re­
sults cast some doubt upon the type of equilibrium analysis employed by 
Green and Newbery, Le, Klemperer and Meyer’s (1989) “supply function 
equilibrium” model. This is because the equilibria found under the assump­
tion that firms submit smooth, i.e. continuously differentiable, supply func­
tions do not appear to  generalize to the case where supply functions must 
be discrete ’step functions’, even when the ’step-length’ can be made very 
small. Indeed, they found that for a wide range of demand distributions, 
pure strategy (i.e, supply function) equilibria will not exist in tins ease. It 
is therefore reassuring to find that Green and Newbery’s most significant 
conclusion for policy purposes, viz. above marginal cost pricing, is also a 
property of the model analyzed here, and hence does not depend upon the 
particular assumptions they impose.
W hile the analysis presented here would appear to be useful in providing
10 W hile the model of Bode (1990) is very close that of Green and Newbery (1992) in  
many respects, its purpose is somewhat more general.
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a framework for studying pricing behavior in the deregulated UK electricity 
industry, the importance of its conclusions is limited by the extent to  which 
it does not take into account opportunities for collusive behavior between 
the generators, nor the effects of long-term contracts between suppliers and 
purchasers (or third parties). These problems call far further research.
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2.6 Appendix: Proofs
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  2.1: Assume by way of contradiction that more than 
one firm has sets winch with positive probability will become the marginal 
operating unit, and, thus determine the system marginal price. Then, since 
the support of the demand distribution is an interval, there must exist two 
sets with rank r and r 4-1, for some r € {1 ,2 ,..., M  — 1), belonging to two 
different firms, both of which will become the marginal operating unit with 
positive probability. Call the firm that owns the set ranked r firm n and 
the other firm n. Note that since firms can secure non-negative profits by 
bidding at marginal cost, one must have pr >  c» and pr + 1  >  c$,.pr <  pr+1 
cannot be part of an equilibrium since by increasing the bid of set r towards 
pr+1, firm n will increase its profit. Increasing the bid in tins a way does not 
affect the ranking but does increase the system marginal price in the event 
that the r’th set becomes the marginal operating unit. pT =  pr + 1  cannot 
be an equilibrium either, since if ^  c^, at least one firm can increase 
its profit by undercutting. For example, if tin <  ca-, PT =  Pr + 1  >  Cn, by 
the argument above, and thus firm n  can increase its profit by undercutting 
firm n by an arbitrarily small amount thereby strictly increasing its chance of 
being called into operation without affecting the (expected) system marginal 
price. QED.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2 .2 r In any equilibrium firm 1 will determine 
the system marginal price with probability one. Assume otherwise, i.e. that 
firm 1 has bid in so many of it sets at high prices that some of the sets of 
firm 2  have a positive probability of becoming the marginal operating unit. 
Since firm 2 can secure non-negative profits by bidding at marginal cost, 
firm 2 will not bid in these sets below C2 - But then firm 1 can increase its 
profit by undercutting such firm 2  sets by some arbitrary amount, since th is 
increases the (expected) amount supplied by firm 1  without affecting the 
system marginal price in any event.
Next we show that the system marginal price will not exceed C2 - Assume 
otherwise. Then since firm 1 always determines the system marginal price,
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it must have bid in sets at a price greater than ca- But then firm 2 can 
increase its profit by undercutting firm 1 .
Lastly, since firm 1’s profit is increasing in bids on the sets that may 
become the marginal operating unit, the only candidate for equilibrium in­
volves these being bid in at cq- (This will be an equilibrium if one imposes 
the tie-breaking rule that if firms tie at C2 , firm 1 is despatched with prob­
ability 1.) QED.
P r o o f o f P ro p o sitio n  2,3: Prom Proposition 2.1 it follows that only 
sets of one firm will determine the system marginal price. Without loss 
of generality, assume that these belong to firm 2. Then since the profits 
of firm 2  are increasing in its awn bids, all these sets will be bid in at p. 
Furthermore, firm 1 must bid in all its sets at offer prices strictly less than p. 
Now, for this to be an equilibrium, firm 1 must bid low enough so that firm 
2  cannot increase its profit by undercutting. Firm 1 bidding at or below firm 
2’s marginal cost is sufficient to guarantee this. (Since firm 1 never becomes 
the marginal firm, it will be willing to do so even if ca < c i.) QED.
Before considering the proofs of Propositions 2.5 and 2.6, we derive some 
properties of the general oligopoly model’s mixed-strategy equilibria when 
firms have equal capacities and demand is distributed discretely as assumed 
in the main text and under the assumption that any number of units will 
be called into operation with positive probability. We start by proving that 
no firm submits offer prices below its marginal cost. We then show that 
p  is always part of same player’s strategy. Lastly, we prove the following 
two results: There can be no mass point at any price in a player’s mixed 
strategy, with the possible exception of p, i.e. no price less than p  is played 
with positive probability. And if pm is the smallest price in the support of 
any player’s strategy, then all prices p  E [pm,p] are in the support of at least 
two players’ strategies’.
Note that for any equilibrium (mixed) strategy profile there exist in­
finitely many (gencrically) equivalent strategy profiles which differ only on 
sets of measure zero. We do not make any distinction between such strate­
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gies.
Lem m a AJ2L1 (Lower hounds for the offer prices) In any equilib­
rium and for all n =  1 , pn >  maxjcjj, 0 2} , (remember that c% is the
marginal cost of the second-most efficient firm).
The resalt is rather obvious and follows from the observation that a 
player, by offering a price below his marginal cost, has a positive probability 
of obtaining a non-positive payoff which could be avoided by choosing a 
higher offer price. From thisT and the fact that no player will choose an offer 
price below and bounded away from the lowest price ever chosen by anyone 
else, one concludes that the system marginal price will not fall below the 
marginal cost of the second-most efficient firm.
Lem m a A .2 . 2  (Upper support) If 7tjv >  0, at least one player will 
have p  as part of his equilibrium strategy.
Proof* Let p  be the highest price in the support of any players strategy 
and assume that p <  p. Let n be one of the players which has p  as part of 
his strategy (in particular, if one player plays p  with positive probability, let 
n be him). Playing p  yields lam  an expected payoff of jwr/f wlnle playing p  
yields prjv >  p?(N- QED. ■
Lem m a A .2 .3  (No interior mass points) In equilibrium no offer 
price p  <  p  will be played with positive probability by any player: Further­
more,, if p  is played with positive probability by some player, no other player 
m il play p with positive probability.
P roof. We start by showing that if p  >  c% is (believed to  be) played with 
positive probability by some player, p  is not played with positive probability 
by any other player. Let p >  max{c2 , c^} be an offer price which is played 
with positive probability by a player n and assume that only n plays p  with 
probability greater than zero (the argument below extends in a straightfor­
ward manner to the case where more than one player plays p  with positive 
probability). Then if a player n, for which c„ <  p  (by lemma 2.1 such a
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player exists), plays p an element in his Gxpoctod payoff is 
N - l
Pr(pa =  p) ^  Pr([Pni+i <  p]n[pn i+ 2  >  p\\pz =  p)\p-Cn]{ y + tt» + i}  (A.1)
r = l
where
Pr(p«o < pjpn =  p) =■ Pr(Pu^+i >  p|p» =  0 5 l
This is the expected payoff in the event that there is a tie at p. Given a 
tie, player n is ranked below n w ith probability 1 / 2  and gets a payoff of p 
whenever he or n is the marginal firm. W ith probability 1/2  n is ranked 
above n and receives p  only when he is the marginal firm. If n plays p  — s 
for some £ >  0 , then in the lim it, as e —» 0 , the corresponding element in 
his expected payoff is 
N - l
Pr(pa = P ) Y 1  Pr(tP«i+l <  P]n b » i+2 >Pl\Pn =P)\p~Cn]{Ki  +  Vi+l}  (A.2)
t = l
The difference between (A .l) and (A.2) is that the latter corresponds to  the 
case where n is always ranked below n whenever n plays p since Ve >  0 ,p  — 
e <  p. AH other elements in the sum which constitute player n’s expected 
payoff from playing p  and p — e, respectively, can be made arbitrarily close 
by choosing e small enough. Thus, there exists e >  0, such that playing p —£ 
yields a strictly higher payoff than playing p and, therefore, playing p with 
positive probability cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy for player n.
We next show that if p <  p is played with positive probability by some 
player n, any offer price exceeding p by any other player will be bounded 
away from p. Consider the payoff to  player n who plays p + £  for some e >  0, 
Then in the lim it, as e >  0, the element in his expected payoff corresponding 
to (A .l) is
N - l
\ Pr(pfi = P ) ] T  Pr([Pni+1 <C ^  0  [Pni+a -'> P]|Pn P)[p (A«3)
! i^l
The difference between this and (A .l) is that n is always ranked above n 
whenever n plays p since Ve >  0 ,p t — p-b s >  p  , i.e. there is never a 
tie. All other corresponding dem ents in the sum which constitute player
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n’s expected payoffs from playing p  and p  )- a, respectively, can be made 
arbitrarily close by choosing £ small enough. Thus there exists e >  0 such 
that for all e E (0 ,e) playing p  yields a strictly higher payoff than playing 
p +  s, and therefore any offer price which forms part of n’s strategy and is 
not less than p, must exceed p  +  £.
Since the above result must hold for all n n, it follows that player n 
would gain by playing p + e instead of p, for some 0 < e < e. This contradicts 
the assumption that p  is  part of his equilibrium strategy and completes the 
proof. QED. ■
Lem m a A .2 .4  (No holes) If p  is pari of any equilibrium strategy, 
then for any interval S  C (p, p], Vp E S, S  are part of at least two players 
equilibrium strategies.
Proof: We first show that there cannot exist any interval 5 C (p,pj, 
such that no player has elements in S as part of his strategy. Assume, for a 
contradiction, that such an interval S exists, and let =  inf{p|p E S } and
Psup =  sup{pjp E S }. Then, for the player n with Pmf — s, for some e >  0, 
as part of las strategy, playing p  =  p^f -j-s E S  instead of p^f — e yields in 
the limit as e —> 0 , an increase in expected payoff of
5 3  ni Pr(bni+1 <  P\ n  frm+1 > 3 1 P n = P )e =  (A.4)
1=1  
N
5 3  ^  <  P] n  bn i+1 >  PliPn G bmf3PBup])£ >  &
i=l
where
Pr([Pno <  PllPn G [Pmf,PBup})? =  Pr([Pni+1  >  p}|Pn G [ptaf,ftnp]) =  1
A contradiction. By applying a similar argument we can show that it is 
not possible that only one player has elements in S as part of his equilibrium 
strategy. If n is the only player with p  =  psup — £ G S  as part of his strategy, 
then by playing p8Up 4 - e, £ >  0  , instead of p  this yields in the limit as e —> 0 , 
an increase in his expected payoff equal to  that in (A.4). QED.
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P ro o f o f P rop osition  2,5: From Lemmas A.2.1-A.2.4 we know that
below leads to a contradiction if one makes the assumption that firm 1 
plays p  with positive probability),, that no player plays any price p  <  p  
with positive probability, and that if pm is the smallest price played by any 
player, both players’ mixed strategies have full support on [pm,p]. Then, 2’s 
expected payoff from playing p  is
Prices below c cannot be in the support o f his equilibrium strategy since 
Vp <  c : $ 2 (p) <  $ 2 (c) =  * 0 +  [1 — 7r][JSpi — c] <  [1 — 7r]{p — c] (A.6 )
Thus, the smallest offer price which is in the support of 2’s strategy must
pm is the smallest price in the support of 2 ’s strategy, then 1 never offers 
anything less than pm, and vice versa
Let Fi(p) =  Pr(pi < p) and /i(p ) =  F* (p), Then the expected payoff to 
player 2  of playing p 6  jpm,p] is
$ 2(p) — 7r[l-F i(p)][p-c]+[l-7r]F i(p)[p-c]+[l-7r] ']h{p)dp  (A.7)
The first two elements in the sum axe the expected payoff when firm 2 is 
the marginal firm, i.e. determines the market price, and one and two firms 
are active respectively. The third element is  the expected payoff given that 
both firms are called into operation and firm 2 has the lower price. From
Using the fact that in equilibrium Vp 6  |pmfp )r$ 2 (p) =  ^  one gets
there is at most one player who plays p with positive probability (this will 
be player 2 , a result which follows from the observation that the argument
$ 2  (p )=  [ l - 7 r ] [ p - c j (A.5)
be strictly greater than his marginal cost. Furthermore, it is clear that if
(A.7)
$ z(p) -  / i (p)(p ~  4} +  [1 ~  2*']F1(p) (A.8)
l - 2 i r f i ( p )  1 _
7T p  — C p  — C
(A.9)
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This and tho fact that F,(p) =  1, imply the following unique solution to  
(A 0):
f InfefP2 , when 7r =  i
A fe ) -  {  when T - 1 (A.10)t 2ir-l lp-d ^ 2tt-1 , wneil 7T 7= 2
„”  =  /  £?  +  c.  ,whem r =  i
\  Ip -  cI[ir^l 1~2,r +  c .when tt ^  |
where ln(e) =  1 . A similar reasoning gives
{ ln(e-r ^iT, .when p <  p  and tt =  I_ l f  ,  ,  , {  (A-1 2 )ag=l[y f lc £ - l ]e] * 2tt—I  , w h e n p < p a n d 7 T ^ 2
F2&  =  1 ,
where
7T
«7r =  h— -]* '-*1 — 7T
QED.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2 .6 : Note that it follows from lemma AJ2J2 
that no symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium can contain mass points at 
any offer price. Furthermore, from lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, it follows that in 
any symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, if pm is the smallest offer price, 
all p  £ jpm,p] are in the support of the players’ strategies. Let $ n(/>) be 
the expected payoff to firm n of choosing offer price p. Then one has the 
following
^  rp
$n(p) =  <  p]n[p„ i+1 >  pJIPn =  p)p+  /  pdFniip)} (A. 13)
1 Jp
where
Fniip) =  Pr(pni < p|Pn <  p) =  ('^ r. ^ W l1 -  (A.14)
j—i—1 ' '
Pr([p*1*-! < p] n bnm > p\pn -  p]) = ^ j q % Ml -  q]N 1 (A. 15)
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q =  F(p) =  Pr{pk <  p), /c ^  n (A. 16)
The first part of each element of the sum in (A.13) represents the payoff 
in the event that firm n is the marginal supplier, while the second part is 
the payoff given that firm n supplies but is not the marginal operating unit. 
The sum is over all possible demand realizations.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, it (generically) must be the case that 
for any two points p  and p  in the support of the players’ strategies, $ n(p) =  
$„(p). Thus,
0 =  $« (p) — «*(?) ~  P</fife) (A. 17)
where cf =  /(p). =  F'(p) and
N
«(«)== 1 ;J V -1 ,9) (A.18)
1=1
N - l
m  =  5 3  N - l , g )  (A.19)
*=1
6 ( i - l ; J V - l , , )  =  ( ^ J 11) « r l [ l - ? ] W- 1 (A.20)
and ^
B(i; 1W  -  g p " 1-* (A.21)
j —i A 7 /
b(i\ N , q) is the density function of the binomial probability distribution 
with parameters N  and qT while B{i\ N , q) is one minus the corresponding 
cumulative binomial probability distribution. Note that for IV >  2 and 
5  6  [0,1), b(l -= 1; N  — 1, q) > 0  for all i, with strict inequality for at least
one i, and Bq(i; N  — 1, q) >  0 .Thus \/q £ [0,1)
a(q) >  0, and (A.22)
(A.23)
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Consider the differential equation
( A -2 4 )
Define
K 1 =  max{ck(qr) jg' £ [f}Tl] } >  0 , (A.25)
K \ — min{o-(g) | 0  £ [0,1}} >  0 , (A.26)
K 2 =  mzxL{P{q)\q £ [0,1}} >  0, (A.27)
and
K 2 =  min{/?(g)| € [G, 1 ]} >  0  (A.28.)
Since fl(p, q) and Qq(p, q) arc continuous for p  >  0 and q >  0, and
V? € [0,1] : ft(p, q) >  K /p , (A.29)
where K  =  K 1 [K 2, for every p™ >  0 (A.24) has a unique solution F(p)
where F{pm) =  0 (see Sydsaeter (1984)r p. 25). Since the solution F(p) 
is continuous in pm and f(p ) =  qt >  0 , there exists a pm <  p  such that 
F{p) =  1. Next, one has that
V<? €  [0,1] : D(p, q) >  K % log(p/pm) (A.30)
where K % =  K \ j K 2 <  oo. Therefore,
1 =  F(p) >  f P K %- d p =  K %los (p/pm) (A.31)
Jp™ P
from which it follows that pm >  0. QED.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2.7: Observe that the payoff to a particular 
operating firm is independent of its own offer price. Fix the strategies of 
firms m ^  n, and consider the best response of firm n. Let one of firm n’s 
offer prices be pni =  p. First, for realizations of demand feu which set i of 
firm n is operating and gets positive payoff, i.e. p <  P  and P  >  c„ T the firm 
would have been equally well off offering p ^  =  c„. Second, for realizations
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of demand for which set i is not operating and the system marginal price 
exceeds its  marginal cost, i.e. p >  P  >  c^, firm n would have been strictly 
better of offering pni =  Cn, For realizations of demand such that the system  
marginal price is below its marginal costs, firm n is at least as well off by 
offering Pni — Cn than any other price. Thus, =  c* is a (weakly) dominant 
strategy for firm n. QED.
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3 S p ot M arket C om p etition  and Long-Term  Con­
tra cts in  th e  B ritish  E lectricity  M arket
3.1  Introduction
von dor Fehr and Harbor d (1993) analyzed the noncoaperative equilibria q£ 
electricity spot markets in the absence of contracts, and demonstrated that 
generators will have a strong incentive to  bid above short-run generation 
costs. Green and Newbery (1992) adopted a different analytical approach, 
but reached broadly similar conclusions. In this paper we extend this analy­
sis to include the effects of long-term financial contracts, such as those traded 
in the electricity supply industry in England and Wales between generators 
and electricity distribution companies. Our purpose is to  explore the incen­
tives that financial contracts give for altering bidding behavior in the pool 
and to  analyse the potential functioning of the contract market.
The existing literature on the interaction between long-term contracts 
and imperfectly competitive spot markets has concentrated on futures con­
tracts (see the survey by Anderson, 1990). A general finding of this literar 
ture is that there may be a strategic motives for trading futures contracts 
which are distinct from the traditional hedging and speculative motives. The 
strategic motives vary depending upon the market structure and the nature 
of the underlying commodity or good. However, a fairly robust conclusion 
seems to be that the presence of futures has a pro-competitivc effect: i.e. 
trade in futures contracts tends to increase production above the level that 
would prevail in its absence, thus reducing prices and ameliorating the effi­
ciency losses due to imperfect competition. This is the conclusion reached 
in Cournot oligopoly models whore firms compete in quantities for example 
(Eldor and Zilcha, 1990 and Allaz, 1990). In these Cournot-type models 
futures can act as a commitment to  supply large volumes of output through 
their effect on firms1 marginal revenues. An increase in the number of fu­
tures contracts shifts out a firm’s reaction function and allows it to achieve 
the advantage of Staekelberg leadership.
Unfortunately, the assumptions in this literature on types of long-term
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contracts, market structure, and the organization of transactions make these 
analyses not directly applicable to  the deregulated electricity supply indus­
tries in the UK and elsewhere.20 The electricity spot market in England 
and Wales is organized as a daily reverse auction in which the generators 
submit offer prices on their available capacity, generating units are ranked 
according to their offer prices (i.e. a supply schedule is constructed), and 
half-hourly market prices are determined by the offer prices of the marginal 
generating units. That is, the electricity pod  operates as a uniform, first- 
price, multi-unit auction and does not correspond to a standard Cournot 
car Bertrand spot market game, as typically discussed in the literature on 
futures contracts. In addition, long-term contracts typically take the form 
of options - i.e. they are purely financial contracts unrelated to the purchase 
or sale of electricity in the spot market, rather than futures contracts per 
se.
In this paper we characterize spot and contract market equilibria in 
a model which is explicitly designed to take account of these characteris­
tics of electricity spot and contract markets. We find that the existence of 
long-term contracts tends to put downward pressure on spot market prices 
through their effects on the generators* bidding strategies. For this reason 
the incentive of generators would seem to  be to reduce the sale of contracts 
below what would otherwise be the case without this strategic effect. How­
ever, we also identify a strategic motive which may work in the opposite 
direction: by selling a large number of contracts, a firm can effectively com­
mit itself to  bidding low prices and thus ensuring that it will be despatched 
with its full capacity. A significant result of our analysis, therefore, is that 
options contracts may have strategic commitment value for generators in 
the electricity spot market.21
20Powell (1993) provides a discussion of the role of contracts in the British electricity 
spot market based on the futures approach, using a Cournot model of generator interac­
tion. See also Helm and Powell (1992).
21 There is now a considerable theoretical literature on the commitment value of con­
tracts. See in particular Aghkm and Bolton (1987) and Bewatripont (1988) few early 
analyses; and Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1991) and Green (1990) and the references cited 
therein.
45
By way of background, in the next section we provide a brief overview 
of the contractual structure of the England and Wales industry at the time 
of privatization. In Section 3.3 we then present the formal model of price- 
setting by the duopoly generators, which is subsequently analyzed in Sec­
tions 3-4, 3,5 and 3-6- Section 3-7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to  an 
appendix.
3.2 Contracts in the British E lectricity M arket
Option contracts, or ’contracts for differences’, are a fundamental feature 
of the new electricity market in Britain. At privatization in 1991 both of 
the major generators in England and Wales, National Power and PowerGen, 
were endowed with a portfolio of contracts for differences with the regional 
electricity companies within a pricing and contractual framework set down 
by the government. National Power’s total generation capacity at privati­
zation was approximately 29,500 MW, and 84% (24,800 MW) was ‘covered’ 
by contracts for differences with regional electricity companies. All of these 
contracts had expired by 31st March 1993, and most, if not all, have been 
replaced with new contracts. The situation of PowerGen is similar. Of a 
total capacity in January 1991 of 18,800 MW, PowerGen had contracts for 
differences with regional distribution companies amounting to 86.5% (16,200 
MW), 80% of which had expired by 31st March 1993. Again the majority 
of these contracts have been replaced.22 From these numbers it should be 
clear that contracts for differences have played a very significant role in the 
England and Wales electricity market.
Contracts far differences are written in a variety of forms- Contracts 
may be ‘one-way’ or ‘two-way,’ specify single or multiple prices to apply to  
different periods of the day, contain minimum or maximum take provisions, 
and they may or may not be related to  the actual availability of generat­
ing plant (i.e. ‘firm’ or ‘non firm’ contracts). In their most basic form all
22 See James Capel & Co. (1990) and Holmes and Plaskett (1991) for a more complete 
description than is given here. Since the expiry o f the initial ‘vesting’ contracts information 
concerning the contractual liabilities of the privatized electricity companies has not been 
in the public domain.
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contracts specify a strike price and a (megawatt) quantity to  which they 
apply. Under a one-way contract, when the electricity spot (or pool) price 
exceeds the specified strike price, then the holder of the contract receives a 
‘difference payment’ equal to  the difference between the strike price and the 
pool price multiplied by the specified quantity. Under a two-way contract a 
negative difference payment is made whenever the pool price is less than the 
contract strike price. In the England and Wales electricity market at priva­
tization, the vast majority of contracts far differences sold by the generators 
to the regional electricity (distribution) companies were one-way contracts. 
The important point however is that these contracts axe not related to any 
physical trade in electricity, and the market for contracts is not necessarily 
limited to participants in the industry.
Trade in long-term contracts of one to five years in duration has generally 
occurred via auction or direct negotiation between the major generators, 
electricity distribution companies and large consumers. There have also 
been attempts to  organize more liquid short term markets, with only limited 
success to  date. A market in short-term contracts with a duration of one 
month - Electricity Forward Agreements (EFA’s) - was created in Britain in 
1993, under which trade is carried out through a broker. However trade in 
this market has never been brisk.
We analyse spot market competition between duopoly generators for 
an extremely simple contractual form, and focus our attention on one-way 
contracts. In section 3.6 and Appendix A w e discuss how our results are 
modified when other types of contracts are considered.
3.3 The M odel
We consider a model which abstracts from some of the more detailed fea­
tures of electricity contracts while still being able to  shed some light on the 
interaction between the market for contracts and the electricity spot market. 
Wc focus on standardized ‘one-way option contracts’ of the following form: 
a contract is  for one unit (e.g. a megawatt hour) and commits, the contract
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seller to pay any positive difference between the pool price and the strike 
price to the holder of the contract* We assume that the duopoly generators 
are net sellers of such contracts. We later extend the analysis to other forms 
of contracts as well: in particular contracts which give the generators the 
right to claim any positive difference between the contract strike price and 
the electricity pool price, and two-way, or fixed-price, contracts, which in 
this set-up are identical to futures. The formal analysis is very similar for all 
three forms of contracts, and since the first foarm was initially the most com­
mon in the England and Wales electricity market, we concentrate attention 
on this, relegating the analysis of the other contract types to an appendix.
Our analysis is. limited to one ‘type’ of contract; that isT we assume that 
the contract strike price is given exogenously, and then consider how many 
contracts the generators would like to sell. Since our main interest is in the 
interaction between the contract market and the electricity spot market, 
such a limited scope seems natural. A complete analysis of the market for 
contracts would require both a full specification of demand (by consumers 
and electricity distribution companies), as well as allowing for the presence 
of multiple contract types. However, our model does allow us to evaluate 
how different types of contracts affect the outcome of competition in the 
spot market, and, thus, how this feeds back on the generators’ incentives to  
sell particular types of contracts.
Our model of competition in the electricity spot market is based on the 
approach developed in von der Fehr and Harhord (199&), but we make a 
number of further simplifying assumptions here. Most importantly, whereas 
in the more general model firms are allowed to  submit step supply curves 
(i-e. different bids for individual generating units), here they are constrained 
to a single bid for the whole of their capacity, i.e. it is as if each firm owns 
only a single unit. All of our major results generalize straightforwardly to 
the case where generators submit step supply functions so this assumption 
is not restrictive.
The details o f the model are as follows. We consider a two-stage duopoly
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game. In the first stage firms (generators) compete in the market for long­
term contracts, and in the second stage price competition in tire spot market 
takes place. We thus have:
S tage 1 : The generators simultaneously decide how many contracts
to sell, where is the number of contracts sold by generator i 7i — 1 , 2 .
S tage 2.1: Offer prices at which the generators are willing to supply
output, are submitted, where pi £ (—oo,p] is the offer price of generator 
i7i — 1,2. The capacity of generator i is denoted fc*,i =  1,2. W .l.o.g. we
assume k\ =  k <  l,and k2 ~ 2  — k.
S tage 2.2: The generators are ranked according to  their offer prices,
such that generator i is ranked before generator j if p* <  pj.. If p\ =  pa, the 
generators are ranked first with equal probability (=  1 / 2 ).
S tage 2.3: Demand, d, is realized, d is a random variable with
distribution function G(d)7 where supp G(') — [a76]T0 < a <  b <  2~
S tage 2.4: The firms are despatched to match supply. Let i be the
generator ranked first. If d <  ki, only I supplies. If d  >  Jfc*, i is despatched 
with its total capacity while the generator ranked second produces d — fc*.
Marginal costs are constant and equal for both firms, and are normalized 
to zero.
A. system  marginal price,. ps r is determined as the offer price o£ the 
marginal operating generator. A generator i which is despatched with quan­
tity  iji £ [0, fcj], earns p5 ■ From this, payouts on its stock of long-term  
contracts is subtracted: Xi • m ax{p> — 0 }, where q is the contract strike
price. Throughout we assume q £ (0,p), which seems reasonable given that 
the system marginal price will never fall below 0  and, by assumption, is 
bounded from above by p.
3.4 Spot M arket C om petition
In this section we analyse second-stage spot-market competition, after the 
generators have already sold contracts in the amounts x\ and X2 , respec­
tively, at a given strike price q. We assume that the firms have equal capac-
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itics, i.e. k =  1 . Our results will depend importantly on the distribution of 
demand. In particular, we distinguish between three cases;
L ow -dem and period: suppG(') C [0,1], i.e. only the generator ranked 
first will be producing;
H igh-dem and period: suppG(-) C (1,2]., i.e. both generators will be 
producing; and
V ariable-dem and period: S i,S 2  € suppG(-), such that Si € [0,1] 
and S% €  (1 , 2 ] , i.e. there is positive probability for both the event that only 
one generator produces and the event that both firms will be called into 
operation.
In the following subsections we consider these cases separately. In the 
first, which we call ‘low-demand periods’, competition to become the lowest 
pricing firm is so fierce that the competitive outcome results irrespective of 
whether or not firms have entered into long-term contracts. In the second 
case - ‘high-demand periods’ - contracts do matter, but only when firms 
have sold sufficiently large numbers of them. Contracts reduce the incentive 
of the generators to submit offer prices above the contract strike price, and 
when the number of contracts is large enough, the pool price is equal to 
the contract strike price rather than the highest admissible price p. In the 
third case, ‘variahle-demand periods’, we again find that the equilibrium 
pool price is lower the larger the number of contracts the firms have sold 
and the lower the contract strike price.
3.4.1 Low-demand periods
As can readily be established, for the first two cases (lcrw-demand and 
high-demand periods), there is no loss of generality in confining attention to  
degenerate distribution functions, i.e. we let d  be non-stochastic (see von der 
Fehr and Harbord, 1992). In tins sub-section, therefore, it is assumed that 
demand is determinate and so low that only one firm will be despatched, 
that is, P r(d  =  d € (0 ,1)) =  1. Under this assumption, it turns out that the 
competitive outcome prevails (as in the standard Bertrand model) whether 
or not the generators have entered into any contracts for differences. In
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p a r t ic u la r , wc may easily prove the following result:
P rop osition  3.1 If d G [0,1], there ia a unique Nash equilibrium in 
the second-stage game in which p i  =  p2  =  0 .
Since total demand can be supplied by a single generator, the higher- 
pricing firm receives no payments from the pool. Its profits will therefore be 
negative if it has sold long-term contracts and the pool price is above the 
contract strike price, and zero otherwise. In order to avoid this outcome, 
there is strong competition to  become the lower-pricing firm, and the end 
result is that offer prices are brought down to marginal cost.
The com petitive outcome result generalizes to any distribution function 
G  such that G (l) =  1, as well as to  cases in which firms are asymmetric 
(k  <  1 and G(k) =  1). Furthermore, the argument does not depend on 
the type of the contract, i.e. the value of q (as long as q G (0,p)), nor on 
the quantity of contracts held by each firm. Indeed, the proposition could 
easily be extended to a model which allowed for multiple contract types. We 
conclude that in low-demand periods, when there is zero probability that 
both firms will be operating, long-term contracts have no effect upon the 
outcome of spot-market competition.
3.4.2 High-demand periods
We turn now from low-demand periods to the polar case in which both 
generators are called into operation with probability one, in particular P r(d  — 
d G (1,2]) =  1. By an argument similar to that of the previous section, it 
can be straightforwardly demonstrated that there is no equilibrium in which 
p i = P 2 > 0 .  p i = p 2 < 0  cannot be an equilibrium either since then either 
firm could secure positive profits by deviating and offering to supply at a 
nonnegative price pi G (Qr<?)- Thus, any equilibrium of the second-stage 
game must involve firms charging different prices. Order firms such that 
xi <  2 2 , i.e. generator 1 has a stock of contracts not exceeding that of 
generator 2. Consider first the case where the number of contracts held by
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each firm is small, in particular, < d  - 1 .  We then have the following 
Nash equilibrium.
P rop osition  3 .2  A ssum e xi <  X2 <  d — I. Then a pure-strategy  
N ash equilibrium o f the second-stage spot-m arket-com petition gam e has the 
following form : P i = p  and p j  <  bj fo r  som e bj < p  , i }j  =  1,2 , i  ^  j .
Rem ark: As should be clear from the argument in the proof, equilibria 
where pj  —p  and p j  <  bj continue to  exist as long as Xj <  d  — 1 .
Since, by assumption, the residual demand facing the higher-pricing firm 
exceeds its stock of long-term contracts, the higher-pricing firm’s profit is 
increasing in its own offer price. Hence given that a firm is going to  bid higher 
than its competitor, it will choose the highest admissible offer price. Now, 
since the higher-pricing firm supplies less to  the pool than the lower-pricing 
firm, undercutting the lower-pricing firms’ offer price will be profitable if the 
gain from selling a larger volume exceeds the loss from a reduced price. In 
equilibrium, therefore, the lower-pricing firm must submit an offer price low 
enough so that such deviations, are rendered unprofitable.
Note that although there exists a continuum of equilibria, in each of 
them the system marginal price equals p  since the higher-pricing firm is the 
marginal operating firm with probability I .23 We may conclude that when 
long-term contracts cover a sufficiently small part of the generators’ respec­
tive (residual) output capacities, then there exist a multiplicity of equilibria, 
but in each of them the system  marginal price is  equal to  the maximum ad­
missible price, and, therefore, the market price is unaffected by the presence 
of long-term contracts.24 Note that this conclusion is independent of the 
type of contract and could be generalized so  as to  allow for multiple con­
tract types; only the quantity of contracts sold by the individual generators 
matters.
23In the non-generic case where =  d — 1, there are additional equilibria,; involving 
Pi — p* <  pand pj satisfying the constraints of Proposition 2 where pf replaces p .
UA  more detailed exposition of the spot market equilibria without contracts is  given in  
von der Febr and Harbord (1992).
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We consider next the case where both generators hold a large number of 
contracts:
P rop osition  3 .3  Assume that x \ >  ([d — l]p — q) / \ p — q] and x<i >  
d — 1. Then any set of strategies {pi,P 2.}, with pi <  pa, constitute a Nash 
equilibrium of the second-stage spot-market-competition game if and only if 
they have the following form: p i <  [d — l]g and p% =  q.
If a generator has contracted for a greater volume of output than the 
residual demand it faces in the poolr its profit w ill be decreasing as. the 
system marginal price, or pool price, increases above the contract strike 
price. In particular, because the higher-pricing firm determines the system  
marginal price whenever its stock of contracts is sufficiently large, its profits 
will be decreasing in its own offer price whenever that exceeds the contract 
strike price. Since, by assumption, firm 2 has sold more contracts than its 
residual demand, it follows that as the higher-pricing firm, it will never bid 
above the contract strike price. On the other hand, below the contract strike 
price the higher-pricing firm’s profit is increasing in its own offer price. Thus, 
any equilibrium where firm 2  bids above firm 1  must have firm 2  bidding 
at the strike price. To ensure the existence of such an equilibrium, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, firm l ’s bid must be low enough so that 
undercutting by firm 2 is unprofitable. Second, firm 1 must not want to  
deviate by bidding above the offer price of firm 2. The latter is ensured by 
the condition that firm l ’s stock of long-term contracts is sufficiently large.
Hence in this case we again find a multiplicity of equilibria, each of which 
now has firm 2  offering to supply at a price equal to the option strike price 
and firm 1 offering a price less than or equal to  [d — \]q. If x± >  d — 1 , 
there are corresponding equilibria where firm 1 is the higher pricing firm 
and bids q. In all of these equilibria the system marginal price is equal 
to the contract strike price, so the existence of long-term contracts places 
downward pressure on prices in this case. Moreover, the type of contracts 
matters; the lower the contract strike juice, the lower is the pool price.
53
In general, when ([d — 1]J> -  q) j\p  — <?] <  x* <  d ™ 1 < X2 , there are two 
types of equilibria corresponding to  those of propositions 2 and 3, respec­
tively. If firm 1 is the higher pricing firm, system marginal price is equal to 
the maximum admissible price p  ; when firm two is the higher pricing firm 
it is equal to  the contract strike price.
Summing up the results of this and the preceding section, we may con­
clude the following. If either of the events {demand can be covered by one 
firm} car {demand cannot be covered by one firm} occur with probability one, 
then there exist pure-strategy equilibria with the following characteristics: 
In low-demand periods (d < 1), price equals marginal costs. In "moder­
ately11 high-demand periods (1  <  d <  1 4 - x{,i — 1 , 2 .), the system marginal 
price equals the long-term contract strike price, while in "vary11 high-demand 
periods (d >  1 +  X{, i =  1 , 2 .), the system marginal price equals the highest 
admissible price. Thus only when both firms will be operating with prob­
ability 1  and the highest pricing firm operates at very low capacity (less 
than the quantity covered by its long-term contracts) will the existence of 
contracts put downward pressure on the spot market price.
3.4.3 Varmbte-demand periods
Finally, to complete the analysis of spot-market equilibria, we turn to the 
case where both the event that one firm will be operating and the event that 
both firms will produce have positive probability. We start by showing that 
when the distribution of contracts is sufficiently asymmetric, pure-strategy 
equilibria exist. Define a(q) =  [E (d  J d >  1 ) — 1] — {Pr(d <  1 )E(d  } d <
1) 4" P r(d  >  1)[2 — E (d  | d >  1 )]}<?/(Pr(d >  l)[p  -<?]}■ Then w© may prove:
P rop osition  3 .4  Assume 0 <  P r(d  <  1 ) <  1. Then if  m ax{x 1 , 2:2 } <  
E (d  I d <  1) or n tin {x i, >  oi(q), no-pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
second-stage spot market competition game exists. I f  X i>  E(d  j d <  1) and 
Xj <  a(q ), pi =  q and P j  —p constitute the only pure-strategy equilibrium 
where p i <  p j , i, j  =  1 , 2 , i ±  j .
Proposition 3.4 may be explained intuitively as follows. If the lower-
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pricing firm bids below the contract strike price, options will not be exer­
cised when only one firm is producing. It follows that the lower-pricing firm’s 
profit is increasing in its own bid for all offer prices below the contract strike 
price, and thus, in equilibrium, it never bids in this range. Furthermore, a 
firm’s profit is always increasing in its own offer price if it holds sufficiently 
few contracts. Thus, a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist in which the 
lower-pricing firm holds few contracts since in that case it would always 
want to  increase its bid towards the offer price of the higher-pricing firm. 
By a similar argument, it follows that the higher-pricing firm must hold few 
contracts since otherwise it would always want to reduce its bid towards 
that of the lower-pricing firm. If the lower-pricing firm holds sufficiently 
many contracts and the higher-pricing firm sufficiently few, an equilibrium 
exists in which the two firms bid at the contract strike price and the high­
est admissible price, respectively. Otherwise, no pure-strategy equilibrium 
exists.
For the range of parameter values for which pure-strategy equilibria do 
not exist, we consider equilibria in mixed strategies. We do so by analyzing 
the specific example in which Pr(d  =  1) =  7r and P r(d  =  2 ) =  1 — 7r, i.e. 
there axe only two events; either only the first-ranked firm is despatched 
with its whole capacity, or both firms produce at full capacity. (Note that 
in this example, pure-strategy equilibria cannot exist.) This assumption 
greatly simplifies notation without reducing the generality of the analysis to  
any significant degree.
W .l.o.g. let firm 2 be the firm with more long-term contracts, i.e. >  
x \. Let F{(p) represent the (cumulative) frequency with which firm * plays 
offer prices p  £  [0,p],i — 1,2, i.e. Fj(p) — Pr(pi <  p)- Profits of firm i may 
then be written:
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& (?) =  tt{[1 -F j(p )][p « x i-m a x { p -g ,0 } ]  (3.1)
Xi max{r — q, 0}<fi*j(r)}
+ { 1  -  p] {J^CpJlp -  xi - max{p -  grG})
+  f  [r -  a?i ■ ma*{r -  grO}]dFj(r)}
Jp
where i , j  =  1,2,* ^  j .  Profits equal the sum of the expected payoff in 
the events that only one firm and both firms will be called into operation, 
respectively. When only one firm is despatched, firm i is paid from the pool 
only when it has the lowest offer priceT and then at its awn bid. Similarly, 
when both firms are called into operation, a firm is paid at its own bid 
whenever it has the highest offer price, and at the competitor’s (expected) 
bid otherwise. In either event, and whether it produces or not, a firm will 
have to honour its contracts whenever the system marginal price exceeds 
the contract strike price.
In the appendix we prove the following proposition:
P rop osition  3 .5  Assume P r(d  =  1) =  7r, P r{d  — 2 ) =  1 — tt, 
and x \ <  X2  <  1. Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the 
second-stage spot-market-competition game in which firm  i, i =  1 , 2 , plays 
prices p  G [pm,p] according to the probability distribution Fj(p). pm >  0 and 
J j (p) =  Fs(p) when p  <  q, while Fi (p) <  F%(p) for p >  q.
In equilibrium, players strike a balance between two opposing effects. On 
the one hand, high bid results in a high system marginal price, and payoff, in 
the event that the firm becomes the marginal operating firm. On the other 
hand, bidding high reduces the chance of becoming the lowest-pricing firm, 
and thus being despatched with a large capacity, or indeed any capacity at 
all. In equilibrium these two effects are balanced for all prices in the support 
of the players’ strategies; an interval from a price strictly above marginal 
cost up to  the highest admissible price.
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On average, i.e. in expected terms, the firm with more long-term con­
tracts prices lower in the spot market. In particular, firms play prices below 
the contract strike price with equal probability, while firm l ’s strategy first- 
order stochastically dominates that of firm 2 for higher prices. The under­
lying intuition for this result is that the gain from a high system marginal 
price is less the more contracts a firm has sold. At the margin, the effect on 
profits from an increase in the pool price equals one times the net supply 
to the pool, ije. total output less, the contracted quantity. Therefore, the 
greater is the number of contracts the smaller is the incentive to bid high.
From the formulae for JPi(x), ^ ( x ) ,  and p m (given in the appendix), 
a number of comparative static results can be derived. The lower bound 
on the support of the mixed strategies, pm, is decreasing in the number of 
long-term contracts held by the firm with fewer contracts and increasing in 
the contract strike price. A higher contract strike price, gr also leads to  more 
frequent play of prices above the strike price and less frequent play of lower 
prices. Furthermore, the larger the number of contracts hold by the firm 
with fewer contracts (firm 1 ), the more likely it is that firms play high offer 
prices, while the opposite is the case for the firm with more contracts (firm
2)-
In general, it is  difficult to  derive explicit comparative static results for 
the expected pool price. For the specific example tt =  1 /2 , however, one 
gets
E p =  p { l -  e~ l [ | p  } -  --- \p ~ q \. (3.2)
P 2
In this example therefore, the expected pool price is decreasing in the 
number of contracts held by the firm with most contracts. The pool price 
may increase or decrease in the number of contracts held by the firm with 
fewer contracts depending on the parameters of the model. The pool price 
is  increasing (decreasing) in the contract strike price if  firms hold sufficiently 
many (few) contracts.
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3.5 C om petition  fo r C on tracts
As noted in section 3.3, a full analysis of the first-stage game in which the 
generators compete in the market for long-term contracts, would require 
modelling the demand for contracts by electricity consumers and distribution 
companies as well as spelling out second-stage equilibria in the presence 
of multiple types of contracts* Our scope here is more limited; we want 
to explore how spot-market competition affects firms’ incentives to sell a 
particular type of contract. We do that by fixing the contract strike price and 
considering how the generators’ second-stage profits vary with the number 
of contracts sold. In order to abstract from other incentives to sell contracts 
(e.g. extracting hedging premiums etc.) we make a fairly natural ’’arbitrage” 
assumption: revenues from sales of contracts equal expected payouts. Such 
an assumption is consistent with atomistic price-taking and risk neutral 
buyers (we restrict attention to  the case where neither of the generators is a 
net buyer of options, i.e. Xi >  0, i =  1,2). W hile tins simplification has the 
merit of allowing us to focus exclusively on the incentive to sell contracts 
arising from how long-term contracts affect spot-market competition, it is 
probably unrealistic as fax as the England and Wales industry is concerned. 
In particular, the 12 RECs in England and Wales are few and large enough to 
make concentration on the buyer side an important issue. In the conclusion, 
we comment briefly cm how the presence of strategic buyers, may affect the 
viability of the market for long-term contracts.
As demonstrated in the previous section, the existence of long-term con­
tracts does not affect spot market competition in low-demand periods when 
supp G(d) C [0,1], i.e. when only one firm will be producing for sure, and 
thus there are no strategic incentives arising from the existence of contracts 
in th is case. In the rest of this section we concentrate on the analytically 
simpler (and empirically more interesting) case when demand is greater than 
the capacity of any individual firm, i.e. supp G(d) C (1,2).
As shown in section 3.4, when supp G(d) C (1,2] , there is a multiplicity 
of equilibria in most cases. In particular, there exist sets of equilibria in
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which either one of the generators is the higher-pricing firm, determining 
the system marginal price. We deal with this multiplicity problem in the 
following way: We assume that one or the other pure-strategy equilibria 
will be played in the second stage game. Since the generators are symmetric 
ex ante, Le- prior to the contracting stager it seems reasonable to  assume 
that they have equal probability of playing the roles of high-pricing and 
low-pricing firm, respectively, and thus calculate (expected) payoffs as the 
mean of profits in the two cases. It turns out that our results are robust 
to any alternative formulation in which (expected) payoffs are calculated 
as some weighted average of profits in the two types of equilibria. Thus, if 
one is willing to believe that one or the other of these equilibrium outcomes 
is a reasonable prediction for second-stage spot-market competition, this 
approach would seem to have some merit.
Throughout the rest of this section, wJLo.g. we assume that d is  determi­
nate (generalizing to the stochastic case would basically involve substituting 
Ed  for d in the formulae below). Then, when p i  <  P j  = p  , profits, disre­
garding any revenues from selling contracts, are given by
=  [1 -  X i ] p  +  XiQ, (3.3)
0 ,  =  [d — 1 — X j \ p  +  X j q , (3.4)
while when p, < p j ™ g f
f a  =  q , (3.5)
=  [d -  l]g.
Thus, from propositions 3.2 and 3.3 one gets;
(3.6)
x i , X 2 < d — 1 : Efc — [-d  -  Xi]p -f Xttf, t =  1,2, and (3.7)
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xi ,X2 > d —I : Efa =  -dq , i  =  1,2.
The case when Xi <  d — 1 < xj presents specific problems. As noted in
the discussion in  section 3L4, when X i<  {[d — l}jp — — <?] there are only
equilibria where i is the higher pricing firm and the system marginal price 
equals p . Thus, in this case we get:
fa =  \d ~  1 -  Xi}p 4- Xiq, (3.8)
=  [1 -  X j] p  +  XjQ  (3.9)
When d — 1 >  Xi >  {[d—Ijp—g}/[p —q], there are two types of equilibria, 
one in which firm i prices higher at p  T and one in which j  is the high®: 
pricing firm and offers to supply at a price equal to q. In this case also, we 
assume that payoffs arc given by the mean of the profits in the two different 
equilibria:
E(pi -  i  [d -  1 -  Xi]p +  |  [1 +  Xi]q, and (3.10)
E<f>j =  \  f1 “  x j ]p  +  \  id  “  1 +  x jlQ '  (3-11)
Define d(q) =  {[d — l]p  — <?}/[p — q\. Then the following payoff matrix, 
showing profits including proceeds from sales of contracts, summarizes the 
discussion above (given that d{q) >  0. If d(q) <  0, the first row and the first 
column do not apply.) In cells with two entries, the upper is the expected 
payoff to  firm 1 and the lower the expected payoff to  firm 2. In cells with 
one entry, this gives the payoff to firm i , i  =  1 , 2 :
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xi €  [0, d(q)) xi G [d (q ) ,d -  1 ] x \  G {d — 1,1]
x% €  [0rd(q}) P,  [d -  l ip
x2 € [d(g), d — 1 ] \$ p \d p
£ p + j [ d - l ] « ,
- i ] p  +  k
X2 6  ( d — 1 , 1 ] [d -  1 }p, p 4(<*-itp+5<r»\ p + % [ d - l } q \dq
It is clear that we cannot have equilibria in which both generators have 
sold contracts in excess of the residual demand facing the higher-pricing firm, 
i.e. x\,X 2  >  d — 1. If both generators sell that many contracts, the spot 
market price will be held at the contract strike price. But then a generator 
can benefit from unilaterally reducing its  sales of contracts since this would 
lead to  a higher spot market price (equal to the highest admissible price) in 
the event that this generator is the higher-pricing firm.
Assume d(q) <  0, or q >  [d — l]p . In this case the first column and first 
row do not apply. From the discussion above, it then follows that there can 
only exist equilibria in which both generators hold few contracts. In fact, 
there is  a continuum of such equilibria in which x \ , X2  € [0, d — 1], In all of 
these, contracts are sufficiently few not to  influence the spot market price, 
which equals p  whichever generator is the higher-pricing firm.
When d(q) >  0, and q <  [d — l]p , matters are different. In this case also, 
there exists a continuum of equilibria in which contracts are few enough not 
to  affect spot market prices, in particular,xi, X2 €  [d(q),d — 1], However, 
there also exist equilibria in which generators hold asymmetric contract 
positions, i.e. x» € [0,d(g)) and Xj 6  (d — 1,1] ,i ^  j , i , j  =  1,2. In these 
equilibria, the generator with fewer contracts, i, always acts as the higher- 
pricing firm, pricing at p 7 and earns a smaller payoff than generator j  since 
i is despatched with lower output. Generator i cannot increase its profits 
by selling more contracts; although this would lead to  generator i  acting as 
the lower-pricing firm more often, the spot-market price would fall to the 
contract strike price. Since q < [d  — l]p, the loss from lower spot prices will 
not be outweighed by higher output. Note that, because of this strategic
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effect, when q <  [d l]p  there are no equilibria in which both generators 
hold very few contracts, ox x% <  d(q)7i =■ 1 , 2 ; then a generator would want 
to deviate to a large contract position to obtain the gains from committing 
to become the lower-pricing firm.
We may summarize the above discussion as follows: Since long-term con­
tracts, if held in large enough quantities, place downward pressure on spot 
market prices, there is a strong disincentive to sell such contracts. How­
ever, selling a sufficiently large number of long-term contracts can serve as 
a commitment to becoming the lower-pricing firm in the second-stage price- 
competition game, and thus earning higher profits. Such a commitment is 
only credible far contracts with strike prices that are low enough, because 
given that one generator has sold many contracts of this type, its competitor 
will wish to sell few, and hence accept becoming the higher-pricing firm, in 
order not to  depress the spot-market price by a large amount.
There is now a large literature on the commitment value of contracts 
with third parties (c.f. Dewatripont 1988, Green 1990 and Bensaid and 
Gary-Bobo 1991 and the references cited therein). Most of this literature 
has been concerned with the issue of renegotiation, and whether or not 
contracts can servo as commitment devices whon thoy may be (costlessly) 
renegotiated at various stages during the play of the game. In our model 
of the electricity spot market however, in which contracts with third parties 
can servo as commitment devices, this issue docs not arise. This is because, 
in the first place, the second-stage price competition game is one of simulta­
neous moves, and hence no opportunity for renegotiating contracts occurs. 
And secondly, it is not dear that even if such an opportunity did exist, it 
would have airy effect. Because the contract purchasers (the electricity dis­
tribution companies) are also purchasers of electritity from the pool, and 
hold difference contracts to hedge against the risk of high pool prices, under 
most circumstances they would be unwilling to  renegotiate their contracts 
if this simply had the effect of permitting pool prices to be bid up by one of
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the generators (the relevant case) 25. A distribution company which has full 
contract coverage will be indifferent between all pool prices higher than the 
contract strike price, and hence will never have any incentive to renegotiate; 
and a distribution company which is undercovered wiD strictly prefer not to  
renegotiate.
Hence only in the case of a contract purchaser who has purchased more 
contracts than needed for purely hedging purposes, and who would therefore 
obtain a net profit from higher pool prices, is there any scope for renegoti­
ation to occur. This case however, is an empirically unimportant one, and 
as such not of particular interest. We conclude that in the empirically im­
portant cases, the ‘strategic commitment1 equilibria of the two-stage game 
are probably immune to  renegotiation. This means that the electricity spot 
market is one example of a market in which contracts with (interested) third 
parties would appear to  have strategic commitment value, despite the gener­
ally negative tenor of the conclusions arrived at in the theoretical literature. 
As such, it is of particular interest.
One of the simplifying assumptions we have made in the above analysis, 
is to restrict the firms to a single opportunity to trade in long-term contracts 
before the spot market opens. However it has been argued elsewhere that 
oligopolists may want to revise their contract positions if trade, is permitted 
to occur more than once. Allaz and Vila (1986) show in a model in which 
Cournot oligopolists trade in futures that the accumulated futures positions 
will increase over tim e and the perfectly competitive outcome sometimes 
attained. In our model there is no such tendency. Indeed, the only strategic
2 5 Renegotiation would have to occur after the generator which has sold no contracts 
has (publicly) submitted a (low) price offer, but before the other generator has made a 
bid. A contract holder not simultaneously in the market for electricity, would expect to  
receive no difference payments in this case (since the generator with a large number of 
contracts would also bid low), and hence would be willing to renegotiate his contract(s) 
in order to permit th a t generator to make a higher bid. This would be Pareto improving 
for both the contract-selling generator and the contract holder, and hence contracts would 
serve as ineffectual commitment devices. As the text argues however, this is not the case 
when the contract holder is also a purchaser of electricity in the spot market. Bens aid 
and Gary-Bobo (1991) contains a lucid discussion of the renegotiation issue in a context 
not too dissimilar to the one considered here. See also Green (1990).
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effect we find tends to induce firms to sell a large volume of contracts early. 
However as soon as one firm has acquired the dominant position, its. com­
petitor, for strategic reasons, will wish to reduce its own volume of contracts 
by as much as possible.
3.6 Other Forms o f Contracts
In the preceding sections we have considered contracts which hedge pur­
chasers against unexpectedly high pool prices, and we have assumed through­
out that the generators were net sellers of such contracts. It is straightfor­
ward to  generalize our analysis to other forms of contracts, and in Appendix 
A we show how spot market outcomes will be affected by the presence of 
such contracts. In this section we give a brief overview of the results derived 
in Appendix A.
In principle generators can buy contracts to  hedge against unexpectedly 
low pool prices. Such contracts for differences would, in this setting, be 
equivalent to  European put options, and give the holder a right to claim the 
difference between the strike price and the pool price whenever the former 
exceeds the latter. As we demonstrate, this increases firms’ incentives to bid 
low, since part of the negative effect on payoffs from low bids will be offset 
by contracts. It turns out that, as with European call option contracts, 
in most cases the offer prices, and thus, the system marginal price, are 
unaffected by the number of contracts held. However, if the generators hold 
sufficiently many contracts, equilibrium outcomes may be altered. La low- 
demand periods, the increased incentive to bid low may make undercutting 
profitable even when prices are below marginal cost (if net supply to the 
pool, i.e. output net of the contracted quantity, is negative), and thus 
render pure-strategy equilibria non-existent. In high-demand periods (and, 
indeed, variable-demand periods), fiercer price competition may make the 
competitive (Bertrand-type) outcome an. equilibrium. We thus conclude 
that this form of contract, if anything, tends to put a downward pressure 
on bids, and hence on pool prices.
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Even though the general conclusion is the same for the two types of 
one-way contracts, equilibria do differ depending on what sort of contracts 
generators have sold or bought. This is because there is a basic difference 
in incentives in the two cases. When generators sell contracts which involve 
the payout of differences in periods when the. pool price exceeds the contract 
strike price, their incentive to increase bids in the range above the strike 
price is reduced. As we have seen, this effect tends to make equilibrium 
outcomes where the pool price is very high, more unlikely. On the other 
hand, if generators have hedged against low pool prices by buying call- 
option contracts, it is the incentive to bid in the range below the strike price 
which is affected; in particular, firms tend to become more competitive when 
bidding low. As a result, the competitive outcome where the pool price 
equals marginal cost, is more likely.
When we consider two-way contracts, which in this, context are equiva­
lent to futures, both effects are present at the same time, and hence firms 
incentive to reduce their bids is increased over the whole range of admis­
sible offer prices. In other words, since with two-way contracts generators 
will be hedged against the downward risk of low prices (as with put-option 
contracts) and wifi have to pay out differences whenever the pool price rises 
above the contract strike price (as with calf-option contracts), the incentive 
to bid low is even stronger in this case than in any of the corresponding 
one-way contract cases. The result is that the competitive outcome is more 
likely, even in high-demand periods, and generally offer prices are below 
what they would otherwise have been had firms signed no contracts at all.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has identified a number of important effects that the exis­
tence of long-term options contracts may have on the British electricity 
spot market. In particular we have shown that there are critical quantities 
of contracts that must be held by the generators for contracts to have any 
effect on electricity spot prices. In most cases, when contracts are held in
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large enough quantities, the effect is to reduce spot prices to the contract 
strike prices. However in the variable-demand case7 with contracts held in 
sufficiently asymmetric quantities, the effect was the opposite. Our broad 
conclusion is that when contracts exert any influence at all upon bidding 
strategiesT it is to keep spot prices lower than they would otherwise be. In­
terestingly, this finding is consistent with the evidence presented in Helm 
and Powell (1992) suggesting a marked increase in pool prices during the 
spring of 1991 when a proportion of the initial portfolio of contracts expired 
(see section 3.2).
In addition, in considering the two-stage game (section 3.5) in which the 
generators first choose the quantity of contracts to  sell, and then compete in 
the spot market, we have found that for at least certain parameter values, 
there is a strategic incentive to sell a large quantity of contracts to commit 
to a low-pricing strategy in the second-stage game. Thus contracts may have 
commitment value, and hence be profitable, even if sold for a low price. This 
conclusion relates our analysis to a growing literature on the ‘commitment 
value of contracts with third parties’. The asymmetric equilibria which we 
have identified for the two-stage game, in which only one firm sells (a large 
quantity of) contracts in the first stage in order to become the low pricing 
firm in the second stage, are clearly examples of such a commitment effect 
in operation. While it is not possible to say anything in the abstract about 
the likelihood of observing such strategic commitment effects in practice in 
the electricity spot market, (in particular because the generators1 contract 
portfolios are not public information), this would nevertheless appear to  
be the first positive example of a market in which strategic commitments 
(via contracts with third parties) may have an influence on the outcome of 
competition. As such it is of particular interest.
We find that the strategic incentive for selling contracts, viz. a commit­
ment to  offer prices below the contract strike price, exists only far contracts 
with low strike prices. This result may be related to the discussion of whether 
a viable market for contracts may survive the expiry of the transitional con­
66
tracts arrangements in March 1993 (see e.g. Helm and Powell (1992) and 
Powell (1993)}. While g rit model is- obviously too simplified and abstract 
to provide a satisfactory answer to this question, it does at least identify 
some effects which may be of importance. In particular there appear to  be 
strong disincentives for generators to  sell long-term contracts, and hence we 
would not expect to see both generators holding large contract portfolios. 
Contracts place downward pressure on spot-market prices, a pressure which 
is stronger the lower are strike prices and the larger the number of contracts 
held. On the other hand, there may exist a strategic incentive for selling 
contracts with low strike prices, which would lead to generators to hold very 
asymmetric quantities of low-strike-price contracts.
In addition to the effects identified by our formal analysis, there are a 
number of other features which will be of importance in determining how 
the market for long-term contracts will evolve in the future. If electricity 
buyers are willing to pay risk premia in order to hedge against the volatility 
of spot prices, this will of course make generators more willing to sell con­
tracts. One the other hand, problems of developing adequate standardized 
contracts, may lead to levels of transactions cost which prevent the opening 
of markets for many types of contracts (relating to  coverage, time of day, 
season etc.) because they become too "thin". Furthermore, the fact that 
long-term contracts, if the generators have sold sufficiently many, may lead 
to  lower spot-market prices, suggests that electricity buyers may be willing 
to  pay a premium on contracts in order to  reduce the cost of purchases in 
the spot market. Although this effect could lead to a more viable market 
for long-term contracts, it should be noted that there is a strong externality 
at play; purchasers of electricity would like others to buy, and thus pay the 
premium on, contracts26. All in all it seems doubtful that whether the fact 
that there is concentration on the buyers’ side will overcome any disincentive 
for generators, to  sell contracts.
26This point has been made by Powell (1993).
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3 .8  A ppendix A: Other Forms o f Contracts
In this appendix we extend the analysis of this paper to other forms of 
contracts- We begin by considering the case in which the generators hedge by 
purchasing one-way contracts which give payouts to the generators whenever 
the pool price falls below a specified strike price. We then consider two- 
way contracts, where, in effect, generators have sold part of their capacity 
forward.
A .I . O ne W ay P u t O ption  C ontracts
In this section we consider spot-market equilibria fox the case where the 
generators have bought contracts which give them the right to sell electricity 
at a specified strike price. This type of contract is formally equivalent to a 
European put option. The profit of a generator who has bought Zi contracts 
at a strike price v and supplies yi units of electricity to the pool at the pool 
price ps, is (net of any lump-sum payments to the sellers of contracts):
4>i =  pPyi 4- Zi • m ax{v  — pl<?, 0} , i =  1 ,2. (A .l)
We assume throughout that generators arc net buyers of contracts but do 
not buy more contracts than their output capacity, i.e. Zj £ [0 , , i — 1 , 2 .
We also limit attention to cases where v £ (0,p). As in the previous sections 
we assume — &2 — 1 , and we distinguish between low-demand, high- 
demand, and variahle-demand periods-
Put-option contracts make firms less reluctant to bid low since the down­
ward risk is partly covered, i.e. a minimum price is secured on part of the 
output capacity- As we show below, the result is that if equilibrium bids 
differ from those that would prevail in the case when firms purchase no con­
tracts at all, they will be lower when firms hold these types of contracts. 
In some cases, when firms have purchased a large number of contracts, the 
reduced incentive to bid high which tends to make undercutting the rival 
attractive, may lead to non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria.
A - Law-Demand Periods
In low-demand periods only one firm will be producing. W .l.o.g. we
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assume demand to be non-stochastic. Wc can then prove the following 
proposition:
P rop osition  A .3 .1  Assume d E [0,1]. If m ax{z\,Z 2 } < d, then
there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the second-siage spot-market 
game where p i =  pa =  0. If m a x {z iTZ2 } >  dT no pure strategy.-equilibrium 
exists.
P roof. Payoffs axe given by — pid  4 - Zi ■ m ax{v — pi, 0} and $>j =  
Zj • m ax{v  — pi, 0 } if p* <  p j , and =  \p%d 4 - z* x m ax{v — pi, 0 }, i — 1 , 2 , if 
P i  — P2 - Consider first the case where pi <  pj. Note that when pi <  v and 
firm i is a net supplier to (buyer from) the pool, i.e. d — z% >  0 , (d — <  0 ),
its payoff is increasing (decreasing) in its own offer price. When P i >  v, firm 
i ’s payoff is always increasing in p*. It follows that pi <  pj can never be an 
equilibrium. If p\ =  P2 , deviating to a slightly lower (higher) price is always 
profitable as long as prices are above (below) marginal cost. Thus there 
cannot exist equilibria where p i =  p2 ^  0. The proposition then follows 
by observing that when p\ =  p2  =  0 , neither firm will benefit by deviating 
to a higher price, while the gain to firm i from deviating to a price p  <  0 , 
p[d — is positive if and only if d -  Zi < 0 . ■
Rem ark: In the non-generic case where z\ =  d(z2 =  d), all strategy 
combinations such that 0  =  pi <  p2 ( 0  =  P2  <  p i) are equilibria.
As discussed above, put-option contracts strengthen firms’ incentive to 
reduce their spot-market bids. Therefore it is no surprise that in low-demand 
periods, the perfectly competitive outcome can still be an equilibrium even 
when firms hold such contracts. When the volume of such contracts becomes 
sufficiently large however, the incentive to reduce offer prices leads to  the 
non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria. Observe that firms’ equilibrium 
profits (when such exist) are increasing in both the strike price and the 
number of contracts held (4>z =  Z{V, i =  1,2). As we have seen however, 




We continue to assume d to be non-stochastic, but now let d l (1,2], i.e. 
both firms will be producing for sure. Order firms such that p\ <  pi. Then 
we have:
P rop osition  A .3 .2  Assume 1 <  d <  2. Then, generically, all 
second-stage spot-market equilibrium strategy combinations {p\ ,pct} such that 
pi <  P2 , must satisfy P 2—P and p i < b i ,  where bi =  p[d — 1 ] if p[d — 1 ] >  v 
and b± — {p[d — 1 ] — Z2 v } / \ 1  — zi] otherwise.
P roof, If p i <  p2 , payoffs are given by =  £>2 +  zl ' m ax{v — p 2 , 0} and 
$ 2  =  P2 [d — 1] +  Z2  • m ax{v — P2 , 0}. The payoff to firm 2 is always increasing 
in its own offer price when P2  exceeds v. Furthermore, when P2  <  v, firm 2’s 
payoff is non-decreasing (decreasing) inp 2  whend—1— 2 2  >  0 (<  0) . It follows 
that an equilibrium candidate must have P2  =  p  • The proposition then 
follows by observing that if, and only if, the conditions on p \ are satisfied, 
firm 2 does not want to deviate by undercutting firm 1 , m
In these equilibria, firms’ profits are unaffected by the existence of long­
term contracts; indeed, options are never exercised. However when firms 
have purchased large quantities of such contracts there may exist other equi­
libria in which firms offer to supply at the same price. In particular:
P rop osition  A .3 .3  Assume 1 <  d <  2. Then, there never exists 
eqitilibria of the second-stage spot-market game where p± —p%fL O.pj =  p^ =  
0  is on equilibrium if and only if m in {zi, 2 2 } >  \p /v\ [d — 1]- 
P roof. Assume pi =  p2 - The gain to firm i from undercutting firm j  by an 
arbitrarily small amount is given by p j[l — ^d] which is  positive if p j  >  0 . 
On the other hand, if firm i deviates by raising its price slightly above pj, 
its gain, P j[\d  — 1], is positive if pj <  0. It follows that there cannot exist 
equilibria where pj — P2  7  ^0. When pi — pz — 0-, firm i gains pi[d — 1  — Zi] 
if it deviates to a price p* < v^nd pi[d — 1 ] — Z{V if it deviates to a price 
Pi >  v. Then deviation is unprofitable if and only if  the condition in the 
proposition is fulfilled. ■
Competitive equilibria do not exist in high-demand periods unless firms 
have sold many contracts. In the competitive equilibrium, profits are given
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by — ZiV,i =  1,2. In the asymmetric equilibria, profits are $ 1  =  p  and 
<&2 =  p[d — 1], respectively. When the competitive equilibrium exists, this 
gives higher payoffs to firm 2  than it would get as the higher-pricing firm 
in an asymmetric equilibrium. By invoking a forward-induction argument, 
we. may then rule out asymmetric equilibria where pi <  b* and Pj =  p  
when Zj >  d — 1  (by selling a large amount of contracts, a firm signals 
that it does not expect the asymmetric equilibrium with itself as the higher 
pricing firm to be played). This leaves us, with a unique equilibrium when 
m in {zi, Z'2 } > \p jv][d— 1 ], When this condition is not satisfied, we have 
two types of equilibria, in which firms 1 and 2  are the higher-pricing firm, 
alternately. We conclude that in high-demand periods put-option contracts 
will lead to lower bids if firms have signed large numbers of such contracts,
C. Variable-Demand Periods
We turn now to the case when both the event that only a single firm 
will be despatched and the event that both firms will be producing occur 
with positive probabilities, i.e. 0 < P r{d  <  1 } < 1 . In this case we have the 
following result:
P rop osition  A .3 .4  Assume \p/v][E(d\d >  1) — 1] <  < E(d\d <
1), i =  1,2. Then there exist a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the second- 
stage spot-market game in which pi =  P2  =• 0 .
P roof. W .l.o.g. assume pi < P 2 - Then, if p i < p 2 , payoffs axe given by:
=  Pr{d <  l){p±E(d\d <  1) -f z\ - m ax{v — p i,0 }}  (A.2) 
+ iV (d  >  l){p 2 +  ^1  * m ax{v  — p2 , 0}}
$ 2  =  Pr(d  < 1) x Z2 - m ax{v  — p i,0 }
-l-Fr(d > l ) {p 2 [E(d\d >  1) — 1] ■+■ Z2 • 7nax{v — p2,0}}
(A.3)
while if  p i =  P2 , payoffs are:
-j-Pr(d > 1)  Pi - -E (d \d  >  1) Zi • m ax{v — 0}, % — 1,2.
(A.4)
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N ote that if pi > v, firm i’s profits are a lw a y s  increasing in its own offer 
price. Furthermore, if E{d\d <  1) — Zi >  G(< 0), profits of the lower-pricing 
firm are increasing (decreasing) in its own offer price. Thus, there cannot 
exist equilibria in which p \ < P 2 - The proposition then follows by observing 
that deviation from pi =  p2 ^  0  is always profitable, while deviation from 
Pi =  P2  =  0 is unprofitable if and only if the conditions on the s are 
satisfied. ■
We conclude that in vaxiable-demand periods, the competitive equilib­
rium may prevail only if firms have purchased put-option contracts. How­
ever, if the quantities of contracts held are sufficiently large, no pure-strategy 
equilibrium will exist. We do not characterize mixed-strategy equilibria for 
th is model, but, as in the call-option contracts model, it can be shown that 
in  such equilibria bids will on average be lower the larger are the quantities 
of contracts held by firms,
A .2. T w o W ay C ontracts
In this section we turn to the case when firms have entered into two- 
way contracts, giving both a right and an obligation to sell electricity at a 
specified strike price. Two-way contracts are formally equivalent to futures 
in this setting. The profit to a firm who has sold t,; contracts at a strike 
price w  and is despatched with units of output is
$* =  PS [Vi — Ul +  w ti- (A-5)
Thus two-way contracts effectively reduce output-capacity of a firm as 
far as competition in the spot-market is concerned. The incentive to bid 
high is now reduced for two reasons; the downward risk from low prices 
is partly covered because some of the capacity is sold at a predetermined 
price. Furthermore, if the system marginal price exceeds the contract strike 
price, generators have to pay out differences on their contracts. Thus we 
expect offer prices to  be even lower in this than in either of the models 
where firms enter into one-way contracts. As in the other models, we assume 
w e  [0 ,p ],ti £ =  1 , 2 , and =  &2 =  1 .
A. Low~Demand Periods
7 4
In low-dcmand periods we get the same result as in the case of one­
way put-option contracts; the competitive outcome is. the only equilibrium 
candidate, however, because of the stronger incentive to reduce bids, this 
will only be an equilibrium if firms have entered into limited numbers of 
contracts. By an analogous proof to that of Proposition 3.5, one can prove 
the following result:
P rop osition  A .3 .5  Assume d £ [0,1]. If m ax{ti,t'2 } < d, then 
there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the second-stage spat-market 
game where p i =  p2 =  0. If m a x { t\,t2 }  >  d, no pure-strategy equilibrium 
exists.
B. High-Demand Periods
In high-demand periods, when both firms will be producing, the results 
resemble those for one-way call-option contracts in that the asymmetric 
equilibria in which one firm bids at the highest admissible price can only 
exist when firms hold few contracts. In contrast to that model however, here 
having system marginal price equal to  the contract strike price can never be 
an equilibrium outcome. Instead, the stronger incentive to undercut caused 
by the put-option part of the two-way contracts, makes the competitive 
equilibrium prevail if firms hold large enough quantities of such contracts.
Order firms such that pi <  P2 - We may summarize (without proof) the 
above discussion in two propositions:
P rop osition  A .3 .6  Assume 1 < d < 2. Then if m in { ti , t2 } < d—1, 
all pure-strategy second-stage spot-market equilibrium combinations 
must satisfy pi <  bi and pj = p  , where b{ — p[d — 1 — tf \/\  1 — tj].
Rem ark: If t* < d — 1 <  t j,  there continues to exist equilibria where 
Pi.=  p  , and pj. <  bj.
P rop osition  A .3 .7  Assume 1 < d < 2. Then if  >
d — 1, there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the second-stage 
spot-market game where p i =  p 2  =  0 .
C. VaHable-Demand Periods
As in the model of put-option contracts, in variable-demand periods, i.e.
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0 <  Pr(d  < 1) < , 1 a pure-strategy equilibrium may only exist if firms have 
signed contracts. In particular, if the amounts of contracts are not excessive, 
the competitive equilibrium exists and is unique:
P rop osition  A .3 .8  If E (d  | d >  1) — 1 <  ti <  E (d  | d  <  l ) , i  =  
1 , 2 , there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the second-stage spot- 
market game where pi =  p 2 =  0. Otherwise, no pure-strategy equilibrium 
exists.
3.9 Appendix B: Proofs
P ro o f o f P rop osition  3.1: W .l.o.g. let pi <  p2 - Then if pi_ <  pa, profits 
are given by <&i =  p id  — x\ - m ax{pi — gr0 } and =  ~Z 2  • m ax{pi — qr0 } r 
while if p i =  p2 > profits are 3>t =  \p id  — Xi • max{pi — q, 0}. Existence of 
pi =  P2 =  0 as an equilibrium is straightforward. To prove uniqueness, 
we first observe that pi <  0  cannot be part of an equilibrium since non­
negative profits can be secured by offering to supply at a price equal to  
marginal cost, i.e. zero. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium in which both 
generators submit positive offer prices,, since, if  pi >  Qr firm 2  can obtain an 
increase in profits by undercutting firm 1 by some arbitrarily small amount. 
Lastly, there cannot exist an equilibrium with p\ ~  0 and p2  >  0 cither, 
since generator 1 ’s profit is strictly increasing in pi on [Qr <?). QED-
P ro o f o f P rop osition  3.2: W ithout loss of generality let pi < p2 - 
Then if p i <  pz profits are given by =  pi — x i ■ max{jp2  — q, 0} and 
3>2 =  pi\d  — 1 ] — X2  • m ax\p 2  — q, Q), while if pi =  p2  profits are 3>j =  \p*d — 
Xi ■ m ax{pi — q, 0}, i — 1 , 2 . Note first that p\ =  p% cannot be an equilibrium 
since deviating to  a slightly lower (higher) price is always profitable as long 
as pi —P2 >  &(— 9). If P2  > P i, firm 2’s  profit is increasing in p2  on (pi,p], 
thus p2 =  p. For p2 =  P  to be part of an equilibrium, firm 2’s payoff from 
undercutting firm l ’s offer price must not be greater than its equilibrium 
profits, i.e, if pi — bir then p[d — 1 — x-j] +  qxa >  £»i — x-j • max{bi — qr 0}- It 
follows that either bi =  p[d—1 —x?\-irX2 q < q > o i q < b i =  p[d—1 — #2] / [ l—#2]- 
QED.
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P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  3.3: Let p± <  p%. Since X2  >  d - 1 > 0, firm 2’s 
profit is strictly decreasing in its own offer price on {m ax{p i1q},p]. By an 
argument similar to that given in the proof of proposition 3.2, P2  — Pi cannot 
be an equilibrium, thus pi <  q, and since firm 2 ’s profit is increasing on 
[0t<?] tP2 =  9 - Again by a similar argument to that in the proof of proposition 
3-2, pi <  [d — 1 )q in order to make it unprofitable for firm 2 to undercut 
firm 1. Lastly, when the condition on x\ is fulfilled, firm 1 will not deviate 
to a price greater than q since q >  [d — 1  — x\]p  -h x \q T where the. former is 
l ’s equilibrium profits and the latter the maximum obtainable payoff from 
deviation. QED.
P ro o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  3.4: W in g , let pi <  p%. Then if p i <  p2 r
profits are given by:
E&i =  P r(d  <  l){I?(d |d <  l)p i — x± - m ax{pi — 9 , 0 }} (B .l)
+ P r(d  >  I){ p2 -  x i ■ m ax{p2  -  q, 0} },
E $>2 =  —P r(d  <  l)x 2 - m ax{pi — 9 , 0 } (B*2)
+ P r(d  >  l){[£(rf|d  >  I) — Ijpa ~  X2 ■ m ax{p 2 — q, 0} },
while if p i =  p2 ,
E $ i =  P r(d  <  1){^-E(d\d <  l)p i — Xi • max{pi — 9 , 0 }} (B.3)
4-Pr(d  >  1 ){l/2 [E (d \d  >  l)]pi — xi • max{pi — q, 0 } } ,i =  1,2.
It is straightforward to  show that pi =  p2  cannot constitute an equi­
librium since if p i — p? >  Q(< 0 ), a deviation to  a lower (higher) price is 
always profitable. Then if pi <  P2 , firm l ’s expected profit is increasing
on (—oo ,7ran{9 ,p 2 })- It follows that we cannot have p i,P 2 <  9  in equi­
librium. Purthermore, if x\ < E(d  | d <  1), firm 1’s expected profit is  
increasing on [q,P2 ) also, and no pure-strategy equilibrium can exist. As­
sume then that x i  >  E(d\d <  1), in which case we must have p± =  q. Now,
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if X2 >  E{d\d >  1) -  1, firm 2’s profit is decreasing on [q,p], and thus equi­
librium: cannot exist. If, on tbe other hand, x2 <  E(d\d >  1) — 1, we must 
have p 2 =  p  . To prove the existence of {q ,p}  as an equilibrium, we must 
check that firm 2 would not want to deviate by undercutting firm 1. The 
condition that < a(g)(<  E{d\d  >  1) — 1). ensures this. QED-
P ro o f o f P ro p o sitio n  3.5: We treat the two cases p <  g and p >  q sep­
arately. Noting that for all p  £ supFi(x), =  constant, differentiating 
(p) and solving yields:
that at most one firm plays p  with positive probability. By going through 
similar calculations as those below, one can then show that the opposite 
assum ption i.e. F i(-) does not have a mass point at p  leads to a contradic­
tion.) Using the facts JFhCp) =  1, F2{p) must be continuous at p  =  q, and 
F2{ f n) — 0, where is pm is the lower bound on the support of F2{-), one gets 
FaO  and jF1 as functions of the exogenous parameters. Furthermore, from 
the facts that Fi(*) must have the same support as 1*2 (-) and be continuous 
at p  =  q, straightforward calculations establish that:
when p <  q 
when p >  q
The (unique) solution to this is:
^  2 * - l i  '
[1 -  X j \  In(Cjp),
F M  =
where A i,B i,C i, and jD* are constants to be determined.
Assume that 1*2 (•} does not have a mass point at p  . (It can be proved
F M
Fi(p) when p  < <?(B.6 )
Fi(p) -  1
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’ lpI ' +2t=i, x , i l  wi<™P<s(B.7) 
M * ® 1-**), r _ ,^  w W p > ,.  
i> " * = / c - V 1?1^  i (B.8)
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4  D esigning E lectricity  A uctions
4.1 Introduction
Electricity wholesale markets differ in numerous dimensions, but until re­
cently all have been organized as uniform, first-price auctions. Recent ex­
perience - and the perceived poor performance - of some decentralized elec­
tricity markets however, has led certain regulatory authorities to  consider 
adapting new auction designs. In England and Wales a major overhaul of 
the electricity trading arrangements introduced in 1990 has recently taken 
place, and among the reforms implemented in March 2001, a discriminatory 
or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction format was adopted. The British regulatory author­
ity (Ofgem) believed that uniform auctions are more subject to strategic ma­
nipulation by large traders than are discriminatory auctions, and expected 
the new market design to yield substantial reductions in wholesale electricity 
prices. Similarly, before its collapse, the California Power Exchange commis­
sioned a report by leading auction theorists on the advisability of a switch to  
a discriminatory auction format for the Exchange’s day ahead market, due 
to the increasing incidence of price spikes in both on- and off-peak periods 
(see Kahn et al., 2001).
It is well-known that discriminatory auctions are not generally superior 
to uniform auctions. Both types of auction are commonly used in financial 
and other markets, and there is now a voluminous economic literature de­
voted to their study.27 In multi-unit settings the comparison between these 
two auction forms is particularly complex. Neither theory nor empirical 
evidence tell us that discriminatory auctions perform better than uniform 
auctions in markets such as those fox electricity, although this has become 
controversial.
Wolfram (1999), for instance, argues in favor of uniform auctions for elec­
tricity, and Rassenti, Smith and Wilson (2003) cite experimental evidence
27See Ausubel and Cramton (2002) and Binmore and Swierzbinski (2000) for the theory 
and empirical evidence, Archibald and Malvey (1998) and Belzer and Reinhart (1996) 
discuss the TJS Treasury’s experiments with these auction formats in more detail. See also 
Kremer and Nyborg (2004) .
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■which suggests that discriminatory auctions may reduce volatility (i.e. price 
spikes), but at the expense of higher average prices. Other authors have 
come to opposite conclusions. Federico and Rahman (2003) find theoretical 
evidence in favor of discriminatory auctions, at least for the polar cases of 
perfect competition and monopoly,, while Klemperer (2001r 2002) suggests 
that discriminatory auctions might be less subject to ‘implicit collusion’.28 
Kahn et al. (2001), on the other hand, reject outright the idea that switch­
ing to a discriminatory auction will result in greater competition or lower 
prices.
In Britain, Ofgem has credited the recent fall in wholesale electricity 
prices in England and Wales to the new market design, however this too  
is controversial.29 Evans and Green (2002) present some supporting evi­
dence,30 but Bower (2002) and Newbery (2003) argue that the decline in 
prices is fully explained by the reduction in market concentration brought 
about by asset divestitures, an increase in imports and market excess ca­
pacity. Fabra and Toro (2003) suggest that all of these factors, including 
the change in market design, are significant in explaining the reduction in 
wholesale electricity prices.31
The purpose of this paper is to address this electricity market design 
issue in a tractable model designed to capture some of the key features of 
decentralized electricity markets.32 We characterize equilibrium market out­
28In a model similar to that used in this paper, Fabra (2003) shows that tacit collusion 
may be easier to sustain in uniform auctions than in discriminatory auctions.
290fgem reported a 19% fall in wholesale baseload prices from the implementation of 
the reforms in March 2001 to February 2002, and a 40% reduction since 1998 when the 
reform process began. Wholesale prices have since risen again so that they are now near 
their pre-reform levels.
30 Evans and Green argue that the new trading arrangements may have undermined 
opportunities for tacit collusion. Sweeting (2004) claims to have found evidence of collusion 
in the England and Wales market during the late 1990s, although this finding has been 
challenged by Newbery (2003).
31 Another contributing explanation for the initial fall in prices may be that Ofgem staked 
its reputation on the market reforms delivering lower-cost electricity, and for more than 
a year after their introduction sought to expand its regulatory powers to police ‘market 
abuses’ by smaller generators. See Bishop and McSorely (2001) for a discussion.
“ For a discussion of some methodological issues in modelling electricity markets, which 
has informed our choice of models, see von der Fehr and Harbord (1998) and Fabra, von 
der Fehr and Harbord (2002).
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comes in a discrete, multi-unit auction model for uniform and discriminatory 
electricity auctions under a variety of assumptions concerning costs and ca­
pacity configurations, bid formats, demand elasticities and the number of 
suppliers in the market. Our puipose is to gain an improved understanding 
of how these different auction formats affect suppliers’ bidding incentives,, 
the degree of competition and overall welfare in decentralized electricity 
markets.
Our analysis proceeds by first considering a ‘basic duopoly model’, sim­
ilar to the discrete, multi-unit auction described in von der Fehr and Har­
bord (1993), which is then varied in several directions. In the basic duopoly 
model, two ‘single-unit’ suppliers with asymmetric capacities and (marginal) 
costs face a market demand curve which is assumed to be both perfectly in­
elastic and known with certainty when suppliers submit their offer prices. 
By ‘single-unit’ we mean that each supplier must submit a single price offer 
for its entire capacity (i.e. its bid function is horizontal). This assumption 
simplifies the analysis considerably, but in Section 4.4.1 we show that it is 
largely inessential. The assumption of price-inelastic demand can be jus­
tified by the fact that the vast majority of consumers purchase electricity 
under regulated tariffs which are independent of the prices negotiated in the 
wholesale market, at least in the short run.33 However, in order to evaluate 
some of the possible effects of real-time pricing or demand-side bidding, we 
then extend the basic model and consider downward-sloping demand func­
tions. We also consider the oligopoly case in order to shed some light on the 
relationship between market concentration and market performance.
Finally, the assumption that suppliers have perfect information concern­
ing market demand is descriptively reasonable when applied to markets in 
which offers are ‘short-lived’, such as in Spain where there are 24 hourly 
markets each day (see Garcia-Diaz and Marin, 2003). In such markets sup­
pliers can be assumed to  know the demand they face in any period with a
33 See Wolak and Patrick (1997) and Wilson (2002) on this. In most electricity markets 
large industrial consumers can purchase electricity directly from suppliers or the wholesale 
market, but their demand comprises only a small fraction of the total volume traded.
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high degree of certainty. In markets in which offer prices remain fixed for 
longer periods, e.g. a whole day, such as in Australia and in the original 
market design in England and Wales, on the other hand, it is more accu­
rate to assume that suppliers face some degree of demand uncertainty or 
volatility at the time they submit their offers. Hence we allow for this type 
of uncertainty in Section 4.4.4.
Under each set of assumptions we characterize suppliers’ equilibrium 
bidding behavior in uniform and discriminatory auctions., and compare the 
equilibrium outcomes in terms of prices and productive efficiency. Our main 
insights may be summarized as follows. Equilibrium outcomes in either auc­
tion format fall essentially into one of two categories, depending upon the 
level of demand. In low-demand realizations, prices are competitive in the 
sense that they cannot exceed the cost of the most efficient non-despatched 
supplier; in high-demand realizations, on the other hand, prices exceed the 
cost of even the most inefficient supplier. In high-demand states34 there are 
multiple, price-equivalent pure strategy equilibria in the uniform auction, 
while in the discriminatory auction the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. 
With certain demand (i.e. short-lived bids), payments to suppliers (or aver­
age prices) are lower in the discriminatory auction and numerical examples 
suggest that the difference can be substantial.35 The comparison in terms 
of productive efficiency is ambiguous, however, and depends on parameter 
values as well as on which pure-strategy equilibrium is played in the uniform 
auction. The relative incidence of low-demand and high-demand states de­
pends upon structural features of the market, such as the degree of market 
concentration, and on the market design, in particular the market reserve 
price and opportunities for demand-side bidding. Structural factors that 
reduce the incidence of high-demand states affect bidding strategies in the 
discriminatory, but not in the uniform, auction. Market design changes, on 
the other hand, affect bidding strategies in both types of auction.
34 The terms ‘state’ and ‘realization’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
35 Wrth uncertain demand (or long-lived bids) payments to suppKers are equal in both 
auction formats, at least for the case of symmetric firms.
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4.2 T he M odel
In the basic duopoly model two independent suppliers compete to supply 
the market with productive capacities given by fc* >  0, i =  1,2. Capacity is 
assumed to be perfectly divisible. Supplier i ’s marginal cost of production 
is Ci >  0 for production levels less than capacity, while production above 
capacity is impossible (i.e. infinitely costly). The suppliers are indexed 
such that cjl <  C2 . Without further loss of generality we may normalize 
suppliers’ marginal costs so that 0 =  cj <  C2 =  c. The level of demand 
in any period, 8 T is a random variable which is independent of the market 
price, i.e. perfectly price inelastic. In particular, 6  E [#,#] G. (0, ki +  fo) is 
distributed according to some known distribution function G (&).
The two suppliers compete cor the b a ss  erf bids, or offer prices, submitted 
to the auctioneer. The timing of the game is as follows. Having observed 
the realization of demand, each supplier simultaneously and independently 
submits a bid specifying the minimum price at which it is willing to supply 
the whole of its capacity, 6* < P, i =  1,2, where P  denotes the ‘market re­
serve price,’ possibly determined by regulation.36 We let b =  (6 1 , 6 2) denote 
a bid profile. On the basis erf this profile the auctioneer calls suppliers into 
operation. If suppliers submit different bids, the lower-bidding supplier’s 
capacity is despatched first. If this capacity is not sufficient to satisfy the 
total demand <9, the higher-bidding supplier’s capacity is then despatched 
to serve the residual demand, i.e. total demand minus the capacity of the 
lower-bidding supplier. If the two suppliers submit equal bids, then supplier 
i  is. ranked first with probability piT where p± +  p2 = 17 Pi = 1 if c* <  Cj and 
Pi =  5  if Cj — i =  1,2, i ^
For a given bid profile b, the quantities allocated to each supplier are 
thus independent of the auction format. The output allocated to  supplier i ,
36P  can be interpreted as the price at which all consumers are indifferent between 
consuming and not consuming, or a price cap imposed by the regulatory authorities. See 
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993, 1998).
3 7 This rationing rule is used solely to ensure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium 
in the standard Bertrand game with asymmetric costs.
84
i =  1,2, denoted by qi (0; b), is given by
f  m ln{0 ,ki} i f  b i< b j
qi (0; b) =  < pi min {0, ki} +  [1 -  pj max {0,0 -  k j} if h  — bj (4.1) 
\  m ax{0 ,0 — kj}  if  b i> b j ,
and is solely a function of demand and the bid profile.
The payments made by the auctioneer to the suppliers do depend upon 
the auction format, however. In the uniform auctionr the price received by 
a supplier for any positive quantity despatched by the auctioneer is equal to 
the highest accepted bid in the auction. Hence, for a given value of 0 and a 
bid profile b =  (.hirhj).T supplier i ’s profits., i — l r2, i  ^  j r can be expressed 
as
U (a. ($  b ) if bi ^  bj  and & >  ki (a 0 \
1 lbi ~  °i] Qi (0>b ) otherwise,
where qi (0; b) is determined by (4.1).
In the discriminatory auction, the price received by supplier i for its 
output is equal to its own offer price whenever a bid is wholly or partly 
accepted. Hence for a given value of 0, and a bid profile b, supplier i ’s, 
i — 1,2, profits can be expressed as
*?(0;b) =  [&i-cs ]« (0 ;b) ,  (4.3)
where again qi (0; b) is determined by (4.1).38
Both suppliers are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize their 
expected profits in the auction,
4.3 Equilibrium  A nalysis: A Tale of Two States
We first characterize the Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies 
of the model described in the previous section and then compare equilibrium 
outcomes.39
38Note that the discriminatory auction is essentially a Bertrand-Edgeworth game. See 
Deneckere and Kovenock (1996).
39 All derivations of results are relegated to the Appendix.
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L em m a 4.1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium, the highest accepted 
price offer is in the set {c^P}. Moreoverr in the discriminatory auction, in a 
pure-strategy equilibrium all accepted units are offered at the same price.
Based on this ancillary result, we can prove the main result of this sec­
tion, namely that equilibrium outcomes essentially fall into one of two cat­
egories, depending upon the level of demand:
P rop osition  4.1. There exists 9 =  9 (c, Aq, &2 , P) such that:
(r) (low demand) if & <  <9, in the unique pure-strategy equilibrium the 
highest accepted price offer is c.40
(ii) (high demand) if & >  0, all suppliers are paid prices that exceed c. 
A pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the uniform auction, with the highest 
accepted offer price equal to P , but not in the discriminatory auction.
As is easily seen, in low-demand realizations the equilibrium outcome 
is  both unique and identical across the two auction formats. In the pure- 
strategy equilibrium, both suppliers submit offer prices equal to c (i.e. the 
cost of the inefficient supplier) but only the most efficient supplier produces. 
Hence the equilibrium outcomes in both auctions are competitive in the 
sense that prices are constrained by the cost of the least efficient supplier. 
They are also cost efficient, i.e. overall generation costs are minimized.
In high-demand realizations the equilibrium outcomes are very different. 
In the uniform auction, any pure-strategy equilibrium involves one supplier 
bidding at the market reserve price P , while the other supplier submits an 
offer price sufficiently low so as. to make undercutting unprofitable (cX von 
der Fehr and Harbord, 1993). The precise nature of the equilibrium depends 
upon parameter values. There are three possible cases: (a) if 6 2  <  6  <  #1 ,
40This result describes the standard Bertrand-like equilibrium with asymmetric firms. 
In low-demand states the two types of auction are strategically equivalent, since only one 
supplier ever produces and supplies the entire market. It is well-known that the Bertrand 
equilibrium relies on at least one firm using a weakly-dominated strategy, i.e. bidding at 
cost {Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995), a consequence o f the strategy space being 
continuous. We ignore this issue here, but show in the Appendix that with asymmetric 
firms there also always exist outcome-equivalent equilibria in which the higher-cost firm 
plays a mixed strategy and never plays his own cost with positive probability.
m
or ki <  6  <  +  -p^i, only equilibria in which i>i <  — P  exist; (b) if
< Q <  or "^7 ^ 2  < & <  ki only equilibria in which b% < b i  — P  exist; 
and (c) if 6  >  m a x $ 2  or 6  >  max{ k\ , +  p&i} both types of puro- 
strategy equilibria exist. Note that in Case (a) the equilibrium outcome is 
always cost efficient, white in Case (b) it is always inefficient. In Case (c) 
cost efficiency depends on which equilibrium is played.41
In the discriminatory auction only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in 
high-demand states. In particular, there exists a unique equilibrium in which 
the two suppliers mix over a common support which lies above the cost of 
the inefficient supplier and includes the market reserve price, i.e. b{ £  (c, P], 
i — 1,2. This mixed strategy equilibrium is not efficient in general, as there 
is a positive probability that the inefficient supplier will submit the lowest 
offer price.
The relative likelihood of low-demand versus high-demand states de­
pends upon structural characteristics of the industry and on the strictness 
of the regulatory regime. Straightforward calculations show that
« = /  % u *  k' - l f cku (4-4)
From this expression it follows that, for a given ratio of supplier capaci­
ties,. the incidence of low-demand states is increasing in aggregate capacity. 
The incidence of low-demand states is also greater when suppliers are more 
symmetrically sized; more precisely, given e,P and K ,  with k\ +  &2 ~  K , 
6  is maximized at kj. =  which involves perfect symmetry if c =  0-
Further, cost asymmetry tends to make low-demand states more likely, since 
the loss in profit from undercutting the inefficient rival relative to serving 
residual demand is smaller the higher is his cost. Finally, since pricing m o  
nopolistically and serving residual demand is more profitable the higher is
41 There is also a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria in the uniform auction in high- 
demand realizations. However, since each of these equilibria, (i) involve the higher-cost 
firm playing a weakly-dominated strategy with positive probability, and (ii) is pay-off 
dominated by either of the pure-strategy equilibria, we do not consider them further here. 
See the Appendix for the details.
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the market reserve price, the incidence of high-demand states is greater the 
higher is P. If we think of the market reserve price as a regulatory price cap, 
it follows that stricter regulation can improve market performance, not only 
because market power is reduced in high-demand states, but also because 
the likelihood of high-demand states occurring is lowered.
In comparing market performance across the two auction formats we 
consider both total generation costs and the average price paid to suppliers. 
For auction format /  =  dTur let C? and R f  denote equilibrium levels of total 
generation costs and payments to suppliers, respectively, and let b{ and q{ 
denote supplier i ’s equilibrium offer price and output, respectively. We have 
C* =  E id q f j  f  =  tijd 7 Rd =  bfqf in the discriminatory auction, and 
R 11 =  pu Qi =  pu&, where pu =  max* {b“ | qf >  0} is the market price, in 
the uniform auction. From Proposition 1 the following result is immediate:
Proposition  4.2 . Market performance:
(i) Rd =  iT* if 8  <  6  and R? <  IT  if Q > 6 .
(ii) Cd =  C u if 9 <  ?, Cd >  Cu if ?2 < 0 < ? i, C d <  CT if ?i < 6  <  ?2, 
and Cd ^  C n otherwise, depending upon whether, in the uniform auction, 
an equilibrium is played in which Supplier 1 ear Supplier 2 submits the higher 
offer price.
In other words, the discriminatory auction weakly outperforms the uni­
form auction in terms of payments (or the average price paid), to  suppliers, 
In low-demand realizations the equilibrium outcomes are identical in both 
auctions. In high-demand realizations, the market price is at its maximum 
(P ) in the uniform auction, while prices in the discriminatory auction are 
below P  with positive probability. Comparison of the auctions in terms of 
productive efficiency is more complex, however. In low-demand realizations 
costs are minimized in both auction formats. In high-demand realizationsT 
the comparison is unambiguous in Cases (a) and (b) only. In the uniform 
auction production costs are minimized in Case (a) and maximized in Case 
(b), while in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the discriminatory auction
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the more efficient supplier is undercut by the inefficient supplier with positive 
probability- Hence the cost performance in the uniform auction is superior 
to that of the discriminatory auction in Case (a), but worse in Case (b). In 
Case (c) the comparison depends upon which pure- strategy equilibrium is 
played in the uniform auction.
We conclude this section by considering how the performance of the two 
auction formats depends upon the parameters of the model. A change in 
parameter values affects outcomes in two distinct ways; first, by altering 
the relative incidence of high- versus low-demand states, and secondly by 
affecting the intensity of price competition in high-demand states. The im­
portance of these two effects differ between the two auction formats- In the 
uniform auction, in high-demand realizations, price always equals the mar­
ket reserve price, whereas in the discriminatory auction bidding strategies 
depend on the cost and capacity configuration, as well as. on the level of 
demand and the market reserve price. An increase in the threshold 0 has 
a profound effect on prices in the uniform auction, as prices jump down 
from the market reserve price to marginal cost over the relevant range of 
demand realizations. In the discriminatory auction, however, the effect of 
an increase in 8  is much less pronounced. Since the equilibrium outcomes 
m high-demand realizations approach those of low-demand realizations as 
8  I 8 , a marginal increase in 0  has no effect on the outcome per se.
The different ways in which outcomes are affected by changes in parame­
ter values is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The figure is based on an example 
in which [£,0] =  [0,1], c =  0, P  =  1 and k\ — =  y .  The two solid lines
show (expected) equilibrium prices for different realizations of demand for 
the two auction formats when K  — 1. In both formats, price equals c — 0 
when 8  < 6  =  0.5. When 8  >  6 , price equals P  — 1 in the uniform auction, 
whereas it increases gradually with demand in the discriminatory format. 
The thin lines show the corresponding prices fen: the case K  =  1.2, in which 
the critical threshold is now 8  =  0.6. Whereas the increase in the relative in­
cidence of low-demand realizations is the same in both auction formats, the
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rK ={
Figure 1: Expected Equilibrium Prices for Different Demand Realizations
effects on prices differ: in the uniform auction, prices jump from P  =  1 to 
c  =  0 for some demand realizations; in the discriminatory auction, the effect 
on prices is smoother but applies to a wider range of demand realizations.
Because of this fundamental differences in the way in which the equi­
librium outcomes are affected, it is not possible in general to specify how a 
change in a particular parameter affects the relative performance of the two 
auction formats. In particular, changes in relative performance depend crit­
ically upon the distribution of demand G .  In order to illustrate the possible 
effects, as well as the potential order of magnitudes involved, we proceed by 
considering a series of numerical examples. We maintain the parametriza- 
tion introduced above, with the added assumption that G  (6)  =  6 , and define 
+  &2 =  K  > 1, with k \  >  k 2 - Then expected payments to suppliers taken 
over all possible demand realizations (which are equal to expected profits in 
this case), become E R d =  y  and E R U =  ^ [1 — A^ j [1 -I- A j^, respec­
tively. Table 1 presents numerical results for different values of total installed 
capacity K  for the case in which individual capacities are symmetric, i.e.
h  = k 2 =  f :
At K  =  1, total expected payments are 33% lower in the discriminatory
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K  1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
ER d .250 .160 .090 .040 .010 0
ER U .375 .320 .255 .180 .095 0
.667 .500 .353 .222 .105 na
Table 1: Increasing Installed Capacity
auction. In the uniform auction, a similar reduction in average prices would 
require an excess capacity of 40% (i.e. K  — 1.4).42 In hath auctions,, increas­
ing the size of the players reduces both average prices and revenues. The 
pro-competitive effect on bidding strategics in the discriminatory auction is 
strong enough in this example so that its. relative performance improves the 
higher is the capacity margin.
In Table 2 we present results for different distributions of a given total 
capacity K  =  1.
ky .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
k2  .5 .4 .3 .2 . 1 0
E R d .250 .300 .350 .400 .450 .5
E R U .375 .420 .455 .480 .495 .5
f g j  .667 .714 .769 .833 .909 1
Table 2: Increasing Capacity Asymmetry
A more asymmetric distribution of capacities implies poorer performance 
in both types of auction, although the effect is stronger in the discriminatory 
auction. Reducing the size of the smaller supplier increases the incidence of 
high-demand states. In the discriminatory auction, the larger supplier faces 
a larger residual demand and hence has more to gain from submitting higher 
offer prices. Given this, the smaller supplier responds by increasing its offer 
prices also. Overall the result is that reallocating capacity from the larger 
to the smaller supplier (e.g. via capacity divestitures) improves the relative 
performance of the discriminatory auction over the uniform auction.
42 Since in both auctions the level of demand served in equilibrium is fixed at 9, expected 
revenues can be taken as a proxy for the expected (average) price paid by consumers.
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Finally, we consider how changes to the market reserve price P  affect 
performance in the two auctions. Using the same ex ample r we fix total 
capacity so K  — 1 and consider symmetric firms, i.e. k\ =  &2 =  O.5.43 
Table 3 below presents the numerical results. Reducing the market reserve 
price reduces equilibrium price (and hence revenues) in both types of auc­
tion without affecting the comparison of their relative performance. This is 
because equilibrium revenues are proportional to the reserve price P  in both 
auctions when c  =  0,
P  1 .9 0.75 .5 .25 0
EB?  .250 .225 .188 .125 .063 0
E R U .375 .334 .281 .188 .094 0
f j g  .667 .667 .667 .667 .667 na
Table 3: Reducing the Market Reserve Price
4.4 Extensions and Variations
In the preceding sections we have analyzed electricity auctions for an asym­
metric duopoly assuming that each supplier could submit only a single offer 
price for its entire capacity, and that demand was both known with cer­
tainty at the time offer prices were submitted and perfectly inelastic. In the 
following subsections we relax each of these assumptions in turn-
4.4.1 Multiple bids
We first extend the analysis by allowing suppliers to submit upward- 
sloping step offer-price functions instead of constraining them to submit 
a single bid for their entire capacity. An offer-price function for supplier 
i T i — l r2T is then a set of price-quantity pairs r n =  l r—rN ir
Ni <  oo. For each pair, the offer price bin specifies the minimum price for the 
corresponding capacity increment where €  [0, P] and 
i  =  1,2. The following lemma states that the equilibrium outcomes - but not
43 This implies that the incidence of high versus low demand states is unaffected by 
changes in the market reserve price P  in this example.
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the equilibrium pricing strategies - are essentially independent of the number 
of admissible steps in each supplier’s bid function (and whether the ‘step 
sizes’ are choice variables for suppliers). This implies that our comparisons 
between auction types remain valid in this setting.
Lem m a 4.2. (Multiple-unit suppliers) (i) Uniform auction: the set 
of (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcomes is independent of the number of 
steps in each supplier’s bid function (in particular, whether Ni =  1 or 
Ni >  1). (ii) Discriminatory auction: for low-demand realizations, there 
is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of the number of units per 
supplier. For high-demand realizations, there exists a set of mixed strate­
gies that constitute an equilibrium independently of the number of units 
per supplier; when N± =  N2  =  1 , these strategies constitute the unique 
equilibrium.44
The existence of a unique, competitive equilibrium outcome in the uni­
form auction is. in stark contrast to analyses which assume continuously 
differentiable bid functions, i.e. Ni =  0 0 . As first shown by Wilson (1979), 
and further developed by Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender 
(2 0 0 2 ), in the uniform auction with continuous supply functions there exists 
a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria, some of which result in very low 
revenues for the auctioneer (or high payments to suppliers in procurement 
auctions). The latter are characterized by participants offering very steep 
supply functions which inhibit competition at the margin: faced with a ri­
val’s steep supply function, a supplier’s incentive to price more aggressively 
is offset by the large decrease in price (the ‘price effect’) that is required 
to capture an increment in output (the ‘quantity effect’). Since the ‘price 
effect’ always outweighs the ‘quantity effect’ for units of infinitesimal size, 
extremely collusive-like equilibria can be supported in the continuous uni­
form auction, even in a one-shot game.45
44The equilibrium offer-price functions, however, do depend upon the number of units 
or admissible bids. For instance, there can be payoff-irrelevant units which are offered at 
higher prices so long as sufficiently many units are priced at marginal cost.
45 This type of equilibrium cannot be supported in a discriminatory auction. Klemperer
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Discreteness of the bid functions rules out such equilibria however. When 
suppliers are limited to a finite number of priee-quantity bids, a positive 
increment in output can always be obtained by just slightly undercutting 
the price of a rival’s unit. Since the ‘price effect’ no longer outweighs the 
‘quantity effect’, the collusive-like equilibria found in the continuous auction 
cannot be implemented. This observation casts some doubt on the rele­
vance of applying the continuous share auction model to electricity markets 
in which participants are limited to a small number of offer prices per gen­
erating unit. The collusive-like equilibria obtained under the assumption 
that bid functions are continuous do not generalize to models in which of­
fer increments are of positive size, no matter how small these are (see also 
Kremer and Nyborg, 2004). We conclude that the equilibrium outcomes 
for the two types of auction are independent of the number of admissible 
steps in the offer-price functions, so as long as this number is finite. Hence 
the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes provided in Proposition 1 
would remain unchanged if we had instead assumed that suppliers submit 
offer-price functions rather than a single offer price for their whole capacity.
It is tempting to draw the conclusion that limiting the number of al­
lowable bids in a uniform-price electricity auction would therefore improve 
market performance. Strictly speaking, our analysis does not support such 
a conclusion. What we have shown is that (i) moving from a continuous 
to a discrete-bid auction potentially improves market performance by elim­
inating the ‘collusive-like’ equilibria in the uniform, auction, but (ii) market 
performance in a discrete-bid auction is independent of the number of al­
lowable bids, so long as this number is finite. It could be argued, however, 
that since limiting the number of bids does not effectively restrict agents’ 
opportunities, it might be desirable in the interests of market simplicity and 
transparency. Indeed, in equilibrium players may optimally choose not to 
differentiate their bids even when they are able to do so.
(2002) provides a particularly clear discussion.
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4.4.2 Price-clastic demand
Qur next variation on the. basic duopoly model considers the case of 
price-elastic demand. For this purpose we let the market demand function 
be represented by D(p, 8 ), which is assumed to satisfy the following standard 
assumptions; as a function of p, D  is continuous and bounded; there exists a 
price p (#) >  0 such that D (p ,8 ) =  0 if and only if p  >  p  (0); D  is decreasing 
in p, Vp £ [G,p(0)]; and pD  is concave in p, Vp £ [O,p(0)].
Given a downward-sloping demand function, in either auction format 
the output allocated to supplier i, qi (b,0), as a function of the offer price 
profile b  =  (b{, bj), becomes:
Imin {D  (bi, 8 ) , ki} if bj <  bjn m m { V ( b i ,0 ) ,k i}  if h, =  b}
+ P jm m {m so t{v ,D (b i ,8) — kj} ,ki}  J
min {max {0, D  (bi, 8 ) - kj] , ki} if bi > bj,
for i — 1,2. Note that independently of the payments made to suppliers in 
either auction format,, it is implicitly assumed that consumers are charged 
the market-clearing price, i.e. the highest accepted offer price. Obviously, 
this leads to the market (auctioneer) running surpluses in the discriminatory 
auction. Assuming that such surpluses are dealt with via lump-sum trans­
fers, total surplus (i.e. the sum of supplier profits and consumer surplus) 
will be determined solely by the market-clearing price and the allocation of 
output between suppliers..
From the above assumptions it follows that market demand is a contin­
uous and decreasing function of price and that, whenever D(c*) >  kj, j  ^  i, 
there exists a unique price that maximizes a supplier’s profits ham serv­
ing the residual demand, i.e. p \ ( 8 ) =  aig maxp [p  min [D (p, 8 ) — k j , }•.
The price p\ will be referred to as the ‘residual monopoly price’ of supplier 
u
We further assume that the parameter 8  defines a family of demand 
functions such that if 8 \ < 8 2 , D ( p , 8 j) <  D ( p ,8 2 ). Intuitively, 8  is a 
shift parameter that affects the position, but next the slope, of the demand
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function (at loast not to the extent that demand functions corresponding to 
different cross). It follows that p£ (&} is increasing in 0.
Let P [ =  min {p£, P }  be the effective residual monopoly price of sup­
plier i. Then it should be clear that the argument of Lemma 1 goes through 
as beforer with P [  and substituted for P . FurthermoreT we can extend 
the result of Proposition 1 that there exists a unique threshold 0 such that 
equilibrium outcomes axe of the low-demand and high-demand type, respec­
tively,. depending upon whether the shift parameter 8  is below or above the 
threshold. The performance comparison across auction formats is also es­
sentially the same, with the following caveat: since the consumer price is 
generally lower in the discriminatory auction there is an allocative efficiency 
gain due to the corresponding increase in consumption.
Our main purpose of this section, however, is to relate the critical thresh­
old 8  to the price elasticity of demand- To this end we use the following 
definition: for two demand functions D 1 and D 2 with D 1 (p, 0) =  D 2 (p, 8 ) 
at p  =  c, the demand function D 1 is said to be more elastic than the demand 
function D 2  if D l (p, 0} <  D 2 (p, 8 ) for aU p  > c. If we let p[* denote the 
residual monopoly price of supplier i corresponding to the demand function 
.D*, it follows that pj1  < p[ 2 if D 1 is more elastic than D2. The following 
result is then immediate:
P roposition  4,3, The critical threshold 0  is non-decreasing in the 
elasticity of the demand function D.
In other words, the price elasticity of demand affects market performance 
in two distinct ways. First, given a high-demand realization, the distortion 
due to the exercise of market power is smaller when demand is more price- 
elastic (i.e. the residual monopoly price is lower). SecondT the incidence of 
high-demand realizations is reduced the more elastic is the demand curve. 
With a downward-sloping demand function, the gain from exercising market 
power relative to residual demand is less and hence there is more incentive 
to compete for market share by undercutting the rival, leading to a higher
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0 .025 .05 .075 .1 0 0 .125 .15
.250 .226 .203 .183 .163 .146 .130
.375 .350 .327 .304 .282 .260 .240
.667 .646 .621 .602 .578 .562 .542
incidence of competitive outcomes.
We conclude this section by considering a numerical example. We main­
tain the assumptions introduced in the example considered in Section 4.3 
above - with k\ — k2 ~  k - and in addition assume that D  (p, 0) — 6  — ftp. 
It follows that 6  =  k and that (for ft sufficiently small) P f =  
for 0 < k -|- 2ft and P [ =  =  P  =  1 otherwise. Expected payments
to suppliers become EFt? =  f £ +'2^  jp  \ 0  — &]** dO +  2  f^+2ft [0  — ft — k\d9  and 
E R 1L =  +  M d&+ Jk+2ft ~  respectively. In Table 4




Table 4: Increasing the Elasticity of Demand
As expected, a more elastic demand reduces payments to suppliers. In 
this example, the relative incidence of low-demand and high-demand states
(0 ) is not affected, although more elastic demand does reduce the effective 
residual monopoly price. In the discriminatory auction we have the addi­
tional effect that bidding becomes more aggressive in high-demand states. 
Consequently, the relative performance of the discriminatory auction in­
creases with the elasticity of demand here.47 ,46
4.4.3 Oligopoly
Our next variation on the basic duopoly model considers the case of 
oligopoly. This allows us to generalize some of the insights from the duopoly 
model as well as analyze the impact of changes in the number of suppliers
46 Note that, fof ft sufficiently small, ft approximates the price elasticity of demand at 
the peak (i.e. 6 =  1) evaluated at the maximum admissible price P  =  1.
4'As pointed out above, the revenue comparison tends to understate the performance 
of the discriminatory auction relative to that of the uniform auction as far as consumer 
prices (and, indeed, consumer surplus) is concerned.
48The difference in total payments between the two auction formats in the ease of 
perfectly inelastic demand (ft =  0) corresponds to the difference between the cases ft =  0 
and ft — 0.15 in the uniform auction.
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on profits and pricing behavior.
Accordingly we now consider S  suppliers, where ka is the capacity and 
cs the marginal cost of supplier s, s — 1,2 , S. Suppliers are ordered 
by efficiency, so that 0 — c\ < C2 <  ... <  cs — c. As before, the types 
of equilibria which arise in the different auction formats depend upon the 
value of the market demand 0  relative to suppliers’ individual and aggregate 
capacities. In particular, we have the following result:
^ —  —(-
P roposition  4.4 There exists 0S and 6 S , 6 S <  &s , such that, for
a =  1,2,
(i) if 0  <  0 a , in any equilibrium the highest accepted price offer is at or 
below cs;
(ii) if 0  >  in any equilibrium suppliers arc paid prices that arc at 
least equal to  e* and strietly above cs if » =  S  or cs <  G»+i, » — 1 , 2 ,..., S  — 1;
|“ /S.
(iii) 0 J =  0 8 =  0 a if ka >  max* < 5
In other words, we have a series of demand threshold pairs, each pair 
corresponding to the cost of a particular supplier. When demand is below 
the lower of these two thresholds, equilibrium prices are limited by the cost 
of the corresponding supplier; when demand is above the upper threshold, 
equilibrium prices, always exceed the cost of that same supplier. A suffi­
cient condition for the two thresholds to be equal is that the capacity of 
the corresponding supplier is at least as large as that of any more efficient 
supplier.
To demonstrate that the two thresholds may in fact differ, and hence that 
there may be a range of demand outcomes for which competitive and non­
competitive equilibria coexist, consider the following example. Let S  — dr 
ci =  0, Q2 =  0.5, C3  =  1, =  1, &2 =  1, and A& =  0.25. Further­
more, let P  =  1.75 and 0 =  1.5. Then it is easily verified that the fol­
lowing equilibria exist in the uniform auction: {&i =  l r &2 =  0 .5 ,63 = 1 }  and 
{61 =  0 ,62 =  1.75,63 =  1}. Note that the first of these equilibria is compet­
itive in the sense that price is limited by the cost of the inefficient supplier,
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whereas the second equilibrium is not. Note further that the both equilibria 
are inefficient in the sense that overall generation costs are not minimized: 
in particular, when the market outcome is competitive, inefficient dispatch 
nevertheless results.
In the discriminatory auction, no pure-strategy equilibria exists so long 
as B >  . To see this, note that in any equilibrium in which more than
one supplier is despatched, profits of lower-pricing suppliers are strictly in­
creasing in their offer prices below the offer price of the marginal supplier. 
Furthermore, for the marginal supplier, undercutting is always profitable so 
long as competing offer prices are sufficiently close. These opposing forces 
destroy any candidate pur e-strategy equilibrium. We consequently have a 
similar dichotomy to that observed in the duopoly case, in which the com­
parison of outcomes between the two auction formats generally depends on 
which equilibrium, is. played in the uniform auction,
We end this section by considering the relationship between market 
structure and market performance. We take as our starting point a gen­
eralization of the ‘two-state1 result of the duopoly section, which follows as 
a corollary of the above equilibrium characterization:
Corollary 4.1. There exists $ and 6  , 6  <  6  , such that
(i) (low demand) if & <  & , in any equilibrium the highest accepted price 
offer is at or below c;
(ii) (high demand) if 0  >  9 , in any equilibrium suppliers are paid prices 
that exceed c;
—  > — y. ^
(in) Q = 6  =  Q i£ kg >  max.j< g ka~
In low-demand realizations prices are limited by costs, whereas in high- 
demand realizations they axe not. Low-demand equilibria are competitive in 
the sense that prices are limited by the cost of less efficient, non-despatched 
suppliers. However, unlike in the duopoly case, low-demand equilibria are 
not necessarily cost efficient. In the uniform auction there may exist pure- 
strategy equilibria in which less efficient suppliers are ranked before more
99
efficient suppliers, while in the mixed-strategy equilibria of the discrimina­
tory auction such outcomes occur with positive probability.
Tb highlight the relationship between market concentration and perfor­
mance, we focus on the symmetric case, in which we readily obtain the 
following result that corresponds directly with the results obtained in the 
duopoly case:
P rop osition  4-5. In the oligopoly model with symmetric suppliers, 
in particular, ks — ~ r  s —  1,2
(i) (low demand) if 6  <  6  — R? — R? == 0 .
(ii) (high demand) if 9 >  9 =  $jj±K, R d =  P S  [ 0 -  < P 9  =  R i .
Market structure affects equilibrium outcomes differently in the two auc­
tion formats- In both formats, the threshold that determines whether de­
mand is ‘low’ or ‘high’ is increasing in the number of suppliers. In other 
words, pricing at marginal cost is more likely in a more fragmented indus­
try- However, in the discriminatory auction (as opposed to the uniform 
auction), market structure also affects bidding strategies in high-demand 
realizations. In the discriminatory auction suppliers play symmetric mixed 
strategies, and in equilibrium these strategies strike a balance between a 
‘price’ and a ‘quantity’ effect: lowering the price offer reduces the price re­
ceived, but increases the likelihood of undercutting rivals and hence gaining 
a larger market share- For a given level of demand, the ‘quantity effect’ 
is more important the larger is the number of competitors. Hence in the 
discriminatory auction price competition will be more intense the less con­
centrated is the market structure-
To illustrate the above points, we again consider the numerical example 
introduced above, with the specification that ka =  ^  with K  — 1 and 
ca =  0, s =  1,2,...,  S. Expected payments to  suppliers become E R d =  ^  
and ER* — -J ^ , respectively. Numerical values for different numbers of 
suppliers are given in the following table:
A more fragmented industry structure improves the performance of both
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Table 5: Increasing the Number of Suppliers
2 3 4 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
.250 .167 .125 .1 0 0 .050 .005 0
.375 .278 .219 .180 .095 .0 1 0 0
.667 .600 .571 .556 .526 .503 .5
auctions, as well as the relative performance of the discriminatory auction 
in this example- For a given number of suppliers7 the difference in payments 
between the two auctions roughly corresponds to the effect of doubling the 
number of suppliers in the uniform auction.
4.4.4 Long-lived bids
Our final variation on the basic duopoly model considers the case in 
which suppliers face time-varying, or stochastic, demand. This is of partic­
ular relevance to electricity markets in which suppliers submit offer-priccs 
that remain fixed for twenty-four or forty-eight market periods., such as in 
Australia and the original market in England and Wales. We therefore as­
sume here that price offers must be made before the realization of demand 
(i.e. B) is known- It is easy to verify that our previous analysis is robust to 
this change in the timing of decisions so long as the largest possible demand 
realization is low enough, or the lowest possible demand realization is large 
enough- For instance, when demand never exceeds the critical threshold 
9 defined in Proposition 1 equilibria correspond to those analyzed for low- 
demand realizations. The introduction of demand variability adds a new 
dimension to the problem only when both low and high demand realizations 
occur with positive probability. We therefore assume that demand 6  takes 
values in the support [#,#} Q (0, k\ +  £2 ), with 9 <  9 <  9, according to 
some (commonly known) distribution function G(9)\
The equilibria of both the uniform and discriminatory auctions now differ 
significantly from the case in which demand is known with certainty before 
bids are submitted- Demand uncertainty, or variability, upsets all candi­
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date pur e-strategy equilibria in both types of auction (see von der Fehr and 
Harbord, 1993- and Garcfa-Diaz, 2000). We therefore consider equilibria in 
mixed strategies. For both the uniform and discriminatory auctions there 
exist unique mixed-strategy equilibria, and it is possible to derive explicit 
formulae for the suppliers’ strategies:49
Lem m a 4.3. Assume [0, tf] C (0, k\ +  fo), with & <  6  < 6 . Then 
there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies in either auction. In 
the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium suppliers submit bids that strictly 
exceed c.
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium in either type of auction, suppliers must 
strike a balance between two opposing effects: on the one hand, a higher 
offer price tends to result in higher equilibrium prices; on the other hand, 
pricing high reduces each suppliers’ expected output, ceteris paribus. The 
first effect is less pronounced in the uniform auction than in the discrimina­
tory auction. In the uniform auction, a higher offer price translates into a 
higher market price only in the event that the offer price is marginal, while 
in the discriminatory auction pricing higher always results in the supplier 
increasing the expected price it receives, conditional on being despatched. 
Consequently, there is a tendency for suppliers to price less aggressively in 
the discriminatory auction compared to a uniform auction. This intuition is 
confirmed in the symmetric case (i.e. when ki =  k>2 =  k and C1 — C2  — 0), 
in which the equilibrium mixed-strategy distribution function in the dis­
criminatory auction first-order stochastically dominates the corresponding 
distribution function in the uniform auction, i.e. Ff1 (b) > F f  (fr).50
We have not been able to characterize in detail the relationship between 
the model parameters and suppliers’ equilibrium strategies in the general
49 We are only able to characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria with long-lived bids 
by restricting attention to single-unit suppliers. See Anwar (1999) who shows that the 
equilibria derived under this assumption may not survive when we allow more complicated 
bidding strategies to  be used.
50The result follows from the observation that F f  (6) <  Ff  (b) implies >  7rf, whereas 
in the symmetric case, ir? =  irf.
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case. In the case of symmetric capacities, however, we can show that in the 
limit, as .Q—*k  (or k —* (9), so that demand is always, less than the capacity 
of a single supplier, the mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome in either auc­
tion approaches the equilibrium outcome for a low-demand realization, with 
price equal to the marginal cost of the higher-cost supplier. Similarly, as 
6 —* k (or k —>■ 0), so that demand always exceeds the capacity of a single 
supplier, the equilibrium outcomes approach those for a high-demand real­
ization. Further, in the uniform auction the limiting equilibrium outcome 
is efficient, i.e. the more efficient supplier produces at capacity and the less 
efficient supplier supplies the residual demand. This is in contrast to the 
model with non-stochastic demand, in which there exist both efficient and 
inefficient pure-strategy equilibria in high-demand realizations in the uni­
form auction.51 This suggests that the uniform auction performs better in 
efficiency terms than the discriminatory auction, although we have not been 
able to demonstrate that this result holds generally. Revenue comparisons 
also prove difficult, except in the symmetric case, where it is easily demon­
strated that (in expected terms) total payments to suppliers are the same 
in both auction formats.
We end this section by comparing market performance under short-lived 
and long-lived bids, respectively. This comparison is. difficult in the general 
case and hence we limit our attention to the symmetric case. Let E R {  and 
E R j  denote expected total supplier payments in auction format /  =  d,u 
in the case of short-lived and long-lived bids, respectively. We obtain the 
following result:
P roposition  4,6. In the symmetric duopoly model, ERj1 < ERg,  
E R f  =  ER$  and E R f  =  E R f .
In other words, while there is no difference in the discriminatory auction, 
in the uniform auction long-lived bids outperform short-lived bids. With
51 The fact that with uncertain demand the efficient outcome is unique might be viewed 
as a justification; for treating this as a natural ‘foeal point’ in the eertain-demand esse 
also.
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short-lived bids, the poor performance of the uniform auction is caused by 
the extreme equilibrium outcome for high-demand realisations, in which 
suppliers are paid the market reserve price. This equilibrium is supported 
by the inframarginal supplier bidding sufficiently low so as to discourage 
undercutting by the high-bidding, price-setting supplier. With long-lived 
bids, however, the low-bidding supplier determines the market price in low- 
demand realizations, and hence has an incentive to increase its offer price. 
As a result, incentives for undercutting and competing for market share are 
increased, leading to more aggressive bidding and lower prices overall in the 
uniform auction.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have characterized equilibrium pricing behavior in uniform 
and discriminatory auctions in a multi-unit auction model reflecting some 
key features of decentralized electricity markets. Equilibria in the two auc­
tion formats have been compared in terms of both average prices paid to  
suppliers and productive efficiency. In the case of certain demand (i.e. short­
lived bids), we found that uniform auctions yield higher average prices than 
discriminatory auctions. Comparison of the auctions in terms of productive 
efficiency is more complex, however, as it depends on which equilibrium is 
played in the uniform auction as well as on parameter values. When demand 
is uncertain (or bids are long-lived), at least in the perfectly symmetric case, 
expected payments to  suppliers are the same in both auction formats.
Our theoretical model is obviously highly stylized, and while it does lead 
to a number of qualitative results, it does not allow us to draw conclusions 
about their quantitative importance. Nevertheless, numerical examples sug­
gest that some of the effects identified may be significant. For example, 
moving from a uniform to a discriminatory auction format in the certain 
demand case may have a. similar effect on average prices to either a dou­
bling of the number of suppliers or increasing the capacity of two symmetric 
duopolists by almost 40%. However, under the restrictive assumption that
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firms are symmetric,52 moving from a uniform auction with long-lived bids 
(as in the original England and Wales market) to a discriminatory auction 
with short-lived bids (as under NETA) has no impact on expected prices. 
This suggests that reduced market concentration and increased total capac­
ity may have been as responsible for the initial reduction in England and 
Wales wholesale electricity prices in 2001/2 as any change in the market 
design, although our model is obviously too specialized to decide this issue.
A key determ.ina.nt of market performance in our analysis, is the relative 
incidence of low-demand and high-demand states, and this does not depend 
upon the auction format. Rather, it depends on other market design issues 
and on structural features of the market. In particular, the incidence of high- 
demand states is lower when there is more excess capacity in the industry, the 
market structure is more fragmented, suppliers have symmetric capacities, 
demand is price elastic and the market reserve price is low. These factors 
affect not only the relative incidence of low and high-demand states, but may 
also influence bidding strategies. Changes in total capacity, the capacity 
distribution and market structure (i.e. ‘structural factors’) have no effect 
on prices in the uniform auction in high-demand states, but can lead to 
more vigorous price competition in the discriminatory auction. Regulatory 
interventions to change the market rulesT on the other hand, affect bidding 
strategies in both types of auction. A reduction in the market reserve price 
reduces average market prices in both auctions. Measures that increase the 
elasticity of demand (e.g. the introduction of demand-side bidding) have 
similar effects. A change from short-lived to long-lived bids, however, which 
makes the demand state uncertain when suppliers’ submit their bids, may 
have a greater effect on prices in the uniform auction.
Our analysis allows us to make the following comments on regulatory 
policy with respect to the design of electricity auctions:
•  Auction format The uniform auction is always weakly outperformed
52 And assuming that the support of the demand distribution includes both high and 
low demand realizations.
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by the discriminatory auction with respect to total revenues in our set­
up- Thus our analysis suggests that a regulator who is only concerned 
with the minimization prices should prefer the discriminatory format. 
However, if the regulator assigns positive weights to both productive 
efficiency and consumer surplus, the auction ranking will depend on 
the specific weights assigned to each, and on industry data.
• Bid format Long-lived bids outperform short-lived bids in the uni­
form auction. In particular, bids that cover a whole day or longer 
periods lead to lower average prices than bids which vary hourly or 
half-hourly. There is no corresponding effect in the discriminatory ac­
tion* However, in both types of auction, a single-bid format performs 
as well as formats in which suppliers are allowed to make multiple bids 
(e.g. different bids for equal-cost capacity units). Our analysis there­
fore provides some support for the view that simplifying bid formats 
- both with regard to duration and structure - is likely to improve 
market performance.
•  Market reserve price Reserve prices, or price caps, in most electricity 
markets are intended to reduce the incidence of high price spikes. A 
lower market reserve price obviously affects prices in events in which 
the price cap binds. However, it also affects prices indirectly via its 
effect on competition, i.c. by reducing the number of high-demand 
periods and intensifying competition in high-demand periods in the 
discriminatory auction.53
•  Demand-side measures Measures to stimulate the price responsiveness 
of demand directly improve allocative efficiency and increase supply 
security. They also result in more competition via similar effects to 
those achieved by reducing the market reserve price.
53 An important caveat i& that we are only considering short-run comparative static ef­
fects, and ignoring longer run investment or entry incentives. In particular, price caps may 
deter investment in peaking capacity, which in some power systems is a major problem.
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From a methodological point of view, the paper has also contributed 
to the analysis of multi-unit electricity auctions in. a number of ways. 54 
First, we have shown that the set of equilibrium outcomes in uniform and 
discriminatory auctions with short-lived bids is essentially independent of 
the number of admissible steps in suppliers’ offer-price functionsT so as long 
as this number is finite. This reduces the complexity involved in the analysis 
of multi-unit auctions as it allows us to focus on the single-unit case with 
no significant loss in generality. Secondly, we have demonstrated that the 
‘implicitly collusive’ equilibria found in the uniform auction when offer prices 
are infinitely divisible are unique to this formulation of the auction (i.e. to 
share auctions), and do not arise when offer-price functions are discrete. 
Hence the concerns expressed in the literature that uniform auctions may 
lead to ‘collusive-like’ outcomes even in potentially competitive periods when 
there is considerable excess capacity, are likely misplaced. 55
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4.6 A ppendix: P roofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let p  denote the highest accepted price offer and let =  p. Clearly,, 
we must have p  >  Ci- Let Cp =  max*- <p Cj and cP — {minc^p Cj if p  < c; 
and P  otherwise}. Suppose p  >  Cp. Then, for j  ^  i with Cj <  p, we must 
have by < p  (with strict inequality if Cj — Cj) since otherwise supplier j  could 
gain by matching (undercutting) bi But then i ’s profit is strictly increasing in 
bi on [p, cP], proving the first part of the result. Lastly, in the discriminatory 
auction, in a pur e-strategy equilibrium we cannot have bj < p, given that 
supplier f  s profit is strictly increasing in bj up to p. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Consider first the possibility of a pur e-strategy equilibrium in which the 
highest accepted offer price equals c. Profits to Supplier i are given by 
[c — Cj] min { 0  — K i - 1 , A*}, where Ki  =  * — 1 ? 2  and K q =  0 , while
the profits from deviating to a higher price is at most (P — c*] max { 0 — K - i , 0}, 
where K - i  =  Yljfr kj • A necessary (and, indeed, sufficient) condition for 
such an equilibrium to exist consequently is [c — c*] min { 0  — K i- \ ,k i ]  — 
[P — CiJ max (0 — K - i ,  0} >  0. Given that, for 0 >  K - i ,  the left-hand side of 
this expression is non-increasing in 0 , there exists a unique 0 *. such that the 
condition is satisfied iff 0 <  0j. Existence of the equilibrium then requires 
0  < min 0 j =  0 .
Consider next the possibility of an equilibrium in which supplier i sub­
mits the highest accepted price offer bi =  P . Clearly, for such an equilib­
rium to exist we must have 0 — K - i  >  0. By the argument in the proof of 
Lemma 1, it fallows, that i ’s equilibrium profits are [P — c»] [0 — K -i \ ,  Ob­
viously, any profitable deviation by i would involve undercutting the com­
petitor so as to increase output (with a consequent fall in price). If the 
competitor prices at cost, the maximum gain from undercutting is given 
by [cj — Cj]m in{0 — K i - 1 , k i }  when 0 E ( K j - i , K j ] . Consequently, a neces­
sary condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that [P — Ci] [0 — K - i ] —
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[cj — Cj\ min {8 -  ki} >  0. By the monotonicity of the left-hand side 
of the condition, it follows that the condition is satisfied iff 8 >  &i, implying 
that a monopolistic pure-strategy equilibrium can exist only if 9 > 9.
The existence of a monopolistic pure-strategy equilibrium in the uniform 
auction when 8 >  0* for some i is straightforward and involves Supplier 
i pricing at P  while the competitor prices sufficiently low so as to make 
undercutting by i  unprofitable. In the discriminatory auction, by the result 
in Lemma 1 that in a pure-strategy equilibrium all accepted units are offered 
at the same price, it follows that there cannot exist an equilibrium in which 
accepted price offers exceed c, since then at least one supplier could increase 
output by (marginally) undercutting its. competitor. When & >  &iT Supplier 
f’s rival knows that a price offer of c being undercut is a probability-zero 
event, and hence will surely price above c also.
For further reference., we register the following results. Noting that we 
must have 0\ >  k2 , is implicitly defined by the equation cmin ^8 %, k\ j- =  
P  — hi j .  It follows that Q\ =  if &\ <  ki and Q\ =  +  -pki if
Q\ >  hi. This may alternatively be stated as 6 \ =  7 ^ ^ 2  if  <  &i and
6 1  =  &2 +  otherwise. Similar reasoning leads to the result that 8 2  =  fci- 
Consequently, 6  =  7 /1 3  &2 if 7 5 3 7 ^ 2  <  &i and 9 =  fci otherwise. Q.E.D.
Mixed-strategy equilibria in the basic model
We now characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in both auction formats. 
We first consider the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in low-demand 
realizations (i.e. for 8  <  9 =  min # 2  j) in both auction formats. Wo 
then consider the uniform auction for high-demand realizations in which 
there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria (i.e. 8 >  m a x L a s t l y  
we characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in the discriminatory auction for 
all high-demand realizations (i.e. 8 >  8 =  min ^#1 , # 2  jO-
Low demand: Both auction formats
Assume 8  <  8  — m in |0 i r0 2 ^  Let b^  and bi denote the infbnum and 
supremum, respectively, of the support of supplier i ’s strategy. We first
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note that bx — b2 ~> c. This follows from the facts that >  q  and that 
profits are strictly increasing in the bid whenever it is the lowest. We next 
observe that supplier i obtains zero profits if bt >  bj. The same is true if 
hi — < b i  —T>2 — b and either no-one plays b with positive probability or, 
if some player does (theFe is at most one), this is supplier 2. It follows that 
at least one player earns zero profits in any mixed-strategy equilibrium. If 
c >  0 , this is not supplier 1 , who can always guarantee positive profits by 
bidding below c; so foi < 6 2 - Furthermore,. if c >  Qr b% =  c, since otherwise 
supplier 2  could obtain positive profits by undercutting.
Consequently, if c >  0, there exist mixed-strategy equilibria in which 
supplier 1 bids bi =  c with probability 1 and supplier 2  (who obtains zero 
profits and is consequently indifferent between any bid at or above c) mixes 
over the range [c, bf) for any V G (c, P)  , according to some strategy F2  (b) — 
Pr (&2 < b) that satisfies F2 (&) >  1 — | , so as to  deter supplier 1 from raising 
his bid. Given supplier 2’s strategy, supplier I ’s profit from bidding b >  c is 
F2 { b ) Q + [ l - F 2 {b ) ] -b 8 < c e :
Note that the set of mixed-strategy equilibria are the same in both auc­
tions and that outcomes (outputs, profits and costs) are identical to those 
of the pure-strategy equilibrium. Note further that while the pure-strategy 
equilibrium involves Supplier 2 playing a weakly-dominated strategy (Le_ 
bidding at c), in any mixed-strategy equilibrhim supplier 2  plays an undom- 
inated strategy almost surely.
If c =  0, min{&i,&2i} =  0* since otherwise either supplier could obtain 
positive profits by undercutting. It follows that there does not exist a mixed- 
strategy equilibrium in this case.
High Demand: Uniform auction
Assume Q >  max =  max {&ir &2 4 - p k j} . Let JF^ *(&) =  Pr {&*• <  b}
denote the equilibrium mixed-strategy of supplier i, i — 1 , 2 , with den­
sity f i(b )  =  F?u(b), and let Sf  be the support of F^. Furthermore, let 
S'1 — (max {inf >S ,^inf S^} , min {supSj^supS^}}- Note first that F “ cannot 
have a mass point on S u. To see this, suppose, for contradiction, that F?
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has a mass point at some bf 6  Su. Then, for some interval [bf, b' 4- e), e >  0, 
«’s competitor would be better off by offering to supply at a price just below 
b' than to offer prices in this interval. But then i ’s profit would be strictly 
increasing on [6', H 4 - e), contradicting the assumption that If is in the sup­
port of i ’s strategy. A similar argument establishes that S? is an interval 
(i.e. without ’holes’). Furthermore, since P  must be in the support of at 
least one supplier’s strategy, we have Su =  5 “fl — (h, P)- We want to 
demonstrate that any mixed-strategy equilibrium has the form
m b ) = \  A i h- < b < p
{ 1 for  b — P
m b )  =  J  b < b < p
\  1 fo r  b =  P
b =  c
where either (i) A\ — 1 and 0 <  Ai  <  1 or (ii) 0 <  A\ <  1 and A 2 =  1.
On (b, P) , strategies must satisfy the following differential equations:
* ? (& )[* -* 2 ] (b)b[k1 +  k2 -&] =  0 ,
+  * * -* ]  =  0 .
On the interior of the support of the mixed strategies the net gam from 
raising the bid marginally must be zero. The first elements on the left- 
hand side of the above expressions represents the gain to a supplier from 
the resulting increase in the price received in the event that the rival bids 
below. The second element represents the loss from reducing the chance 
of being despatched at full capacity instead of serving the residual demand 
only (the difference being,, for supplier zT ki — [8 — fey] =  fei 4  fe2 -  <?)- The 
above expressions may alternatively be written:




F?(b) =  Ai [b — c] fci+fc2-
!Lz *2-
Fg(b) =  A2bkt+k2~6,
with Ai >  Cl, i — 1,2.
Since at most one supplier can play P  with positive probability (i.e., ei­
ther Pr (bi =  P)  =  0 or Pr (6*2 =  P) =  0), we have either (i) lim ^ p  F^(b) <
lim^ p F £ { b )  =  1 , implying A\ =  fcl 2 "and A 2 <  [-p]*i+fe2-* or
6 — k l
(ii) ]imb^ p F { l(b) < limb-^pFgib) — 1 , implying A\  < _i_J fcl+fc'^ a n d  
^  0 —
A2 =  [p]
Note tha±T because there are no mass points on (bT P). and lim&_+c jF“(it) =
a  g-fc-a
0, we must have b — c. Since lim ^ c Fgib) =  A2 Cki+ki~e >  0, while F f  can­
not have a mass point at c, it follows that for a mixed-strategy equilibrium to 
exist it must involveT with positive probability,. Supplier 2 offering to supply 
at prices below his own cost (note that this implies that there does not exist 
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies). The only 
constraint that F2 (b) must satisfy for b < c fellows from the condition that 
undercutting by Supplier 1 must be unprofitable; one solution satisfying this 
constraint is given by the above first-order condition, but a continuum of 
other solutions exist as welL
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium profits become:
7T? -  P{Pr(b 2 - P ) f c 1 4 - [ l ^ P r ( 6 2 - P ) ] [ 0 - f e 2 ] } ,
=  [P — cj {Pr (6i  =  P ) k 2 F [1 — Pr (&i =  P)j [& — fcij f .
Note that, for the class of equilibria in which ] im ^ p  Ffib)  — 1 (implying 
that Ai =  1 and Pr (&i — P ) — 0) total industry profits are maximized in 
the limiting case Pr (6 2  =  P) — 1 (which corresponds to A2 =  0), where 
7r“ =  Pk± and — [P — c] [9 — fci]. This is the same as in the correspond­
ing pure-strategy equilibrium in which Supplier 2 is bidding high, implying
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that profits in this pure-strategy equilibrium dominate those in any mixed- 
strategy equilibrium. Moreover, industry profits are minimized in the case 
Pr (6 2  — P) — 0 (which corresponds to A 2 =  1), where 7r“ — P[9  — 2^] 
and 7r^  =  [P — c] [9 — k{\. Corresponding results hold for the other class of 
mixed-strategy equilibria.
High Demand: Discrcmmatory auction
Assume 9 >  min j# i ,  #2  ^ =  9. From the proof of Proposition 1, there 
are two cases to consider; ^ 1 3  &2 <  k\, hi which case 9 =  -pz^k2 > and 
>  ki, in which case, 9 — k\.
Let Ff{b) — Pr{&j < b} denote the equilibrium mixed strategy of sup­
plier i and let S f  be the support of Ff. Standard arguments (see above) 
imply that S  =  (b, P)  C Sf, S f  Q [£, P] and that F f  and Ff  do not have 
mass joints on [h, P). We want to  show that there exists a unique equilib­
rium with,
minfg,^} b—b r , . p
nun{0,fci}+min{0,fc2}—0 b—c *
1 for h =  P  ’
b—b r i p
min{ &7ki}r-biDia{97k2y—6 b
1 for b =  P
where b =  c +  [P -  c] if Pfcj > [P -  c] fciand b =  if
Pk-2 <  [P — ej ki (note that, in both eases, b >  e).
Suppliers’ profits may be written
7rf(b) =  b |p f( 6) max {9 — k-2 , 0} -f | l  — Pf(6)J min {0, fci} j ,
^ 2  W — [& — ° ]  {-PfW max — ki, 0 } + [l — F f  (6)J min {9, £2 } j  •
A necessary condition for supplier i to be indifferent between any price 
in S f  is that, fear all b £ Sf, wf{b) =  nf, implying
F d(b) _  [6 -clmin{fl,fc2 } - 7rf
1 [& —c] [min{0 ,& i}+  m in{0 ,fo } — #]’
F.d(h) =  himnje.kx} - w f
2 b [min{0 , fci} -f m in{0 , fo} — 9] ’




Observe that the boundary condition F d(b) =  P f  (&) =  0 implies
nf  =  &min{0 , ki]  , 
wf =  [6 — c] min { 0 , ^2 } .
Furthermore, we have
P  — b min { 9, &2 } min { 0 , fcr }
P - cb—*P L J min {0 ,k \}  +  min {0, A^ } ~  0
If % <  in which case 0  >  A?i, we cannot have lim&_>pF^ib) =
1 since this would imply jF-(*(fo) >  1. Consequently, we have the
boundary condition lim&_+p F^(P) =  1 , which implies
*g =  [ P - c | [ 0 - * l J ,
and, together with the condition F d(b) =  0,
r , 6 — k\
b =  c +  P -  c — ■■ ■■■ >  c.
mm {0 , K2 }
If, on the other hand, k\ >  in which case 9 >  we have
the boundary condition lim&_>p  Fd{P} =  1, which implies
*? =  .P [9 -* s] ,
and, together with the condition F f  (6 ) =  0 ,
b =  p  -  >  c.
m in{0 ,
Note that, in both cases, 6  —► c as 0 —► 0, and so, in the limit, tt\ — 
6 — 2^  ^ and 7T2 =  G.
In the case k\ <  (similar results are obtained in the alternative
case), equilibrium profits, expected costs and expected revenues may be
written:'
7rf -  cki +  [P -  c] [0 -  fci] - r -f* ; , and 7rf =  [P -  c] [0 -  A*]
mm (u, K2 \
E C d — Pr {hi <  b}) c[9 — fcx] +  Pr {&i > 6 2} cmin {0, Ibj}




Pr {bx < i-a} =  f  F f ( b ) d F $ ( b )  +  1 -
_______ ky________ P - b




f  F f  ( b ) d P $ ( b )  =   *«■*»> k  - I Z f l n f  L Z S I ]
J  [fci 4- m in { 6 , £2 } — Q\ 0 . P  c  c  P /  .b
In the limit,
l i m P r { 6 i < b 2} =  1 — jr—r  ^
and hence
c—>0 2 m in{0 , £2 } 2
lim Pr {bi < 6 2 } -  1,
C -+ P
i < P r { b i < f e 3 > < l ,
c p - * , ]  <  8 C< < cJ ! i f l w t . ^ ~ H
2
^  +  ^  +  c [ » - y  <  E & < n i  +  * i + Cm inle’k2l + C l e ~ k l] -£
Furthermore, we know that we cannot have ERd =  P9, since this would 
require both suppliers playing P  with positive probability. Thus, EP? <  P9.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Verifying that the arguments of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 go through 
with multiple bids is straightforward. Below we want to demonstrate that, 
in the discriminatory auction, the best response to a rival offering all of his 
capacity at the same price according to an equilibrium distribution function 
is to bid a flat bid function also. Under the assumption that b jn =  bj ,  n — 
1, with bj  chosen according to the distribution function F j ,  supplier
«’s expected profits may be written
(b0  =  \hin -  Ci] {bin) min | ki n , max -  k j  -  ^  k i m , 0 j  j
d- [1 Pj ,
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where we have defined X)m=l Suppose hi is set optimally, that
Ni >  1 and that bin <  for some n  — 1 , 2 , Ni — 1 (i.e. there are
at least two steps in i ’s bid function). We want to show that this leads to 
a contradiction. Consider first the case that 9 >  kj and let n be chosen 
such that 0  < 9 — kj — kim <  fi- Clearly such an n exists and
is unique. Note that we have 9 — kj — kim >  kin for n <  n and
& — kj — kim <  0 for n > ri. Supplier i ’s profit can then be rewritten
as,
n—1
=  ^  ^[^ in i^] kin
71=1
+  f e  -  Ci] f e )
Ni
h  ^ [ i^n Cj] [1 F j  (fr*n)] kin
n=n+l
=  [ha ~  ^  {Fj(biH) [9 -  kj] +  [1 -  Fj (bm)] A*}
n—1
d” ^ [bin b{n\ kin
n=l
Ni
+  5 3  ^ bin ~~ ^  t1 “  Fi  ^  ~  Ci]' I1 “  Fi  (6*n)l) kin-
n=n+1
The first term in the last expression equals the profit Supplier i would obtain 
if all of his units were bid in at the same price bm. The second term is clearly 
negative: it is always profitable to increase offer prices on units that will be 
despatched with probability 1. The last term is negative also. To see this, 
note that if Fj is the mixed-strategy corresponding to an equilibrium in 
which supplier i offers all units at the same price, it must satisfy
7T{ (fej) =  [bi — Ci] {Fj (bi) min {&*, max {9 — k j , 0}}
+  [1 ~  Fj (frj)]mm{ ^ &}} =  Wi,
n- 1
9  — k j  — 5 3  k i - f  [1 — F j  ( b in ) ]  k m
n=l
119
where is some constant. Consider two offer prices b >  b on the support 
of Fj. Then
0 =  [6  — Cj] | Fj min{ki,  max {& — kj, 0}} 4- | l  — Fj (b'j min {ki, 0} j
— — c*j (b^ j min {ki, max {& — kj, 0}} +  | l  — Fj 6^  ^ min {kj, &}|
= Fj j  min {fcj,max { 0  — k j , 0 }} 
+  { [ f t - C j ]  [l - F j  0 ]  -  |f t -  Cj 1 - F i  (b j  |min{fci,l9} 
>  { [ ?  -  Ci] [l -  Fj 0 ]  -  [fr -  cj] ]l -  Fj 0 ] }  min {kj, «} ,
where the inequality follows from the observation that [b — Ci] Fj (b) is in­
creasing in b (the inequality is strict if Q > ki). In the case that 6 <  kj, 
supplier i ’s profits simplify to
Ni
(bi) =  ^  ^[bin Ci] [1 Fj (&in)] kjn,
n— I
and so we can a apply a similar argument to  the one immediately above to  
demonstrate that profits are maximized for bn =  bi2  =  — =  biN{ =  bi- We 
conclude that for supplier i to offer all capacity at a single price is a best 
response to Fj. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let K s =  1 ki be the accumulated capacity of the s most efficient
suppliers and K ~ l =  K s — ki, i <  s, the accumulated capacity of the s most 
efficient suppliers not including supplier i. Note first that accepted price 
offers cannot exceed c* if 6 <  minj<^ {K g*}-  To see thisr suppose that the 
highest accepted price offer were indeed b >  cs. Since at most one supplier 
will offer b with positive probability, all other suppliers i  ^  s, Ci < b, will
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price below b. But then, since 9 <  min*<5 a price offer of b will never
be accepted. It follows that minj<s { K j %} is a lower bound for 9S .
Consider next events in which 9 > K a- \ .  Then, since supplier s never 
price below cs, any supplier i <  s who offers hi <  ca will be accepted with 
probability 1 and despatched at full capacity. It follows that there cannot 
exist an equilibrium in which some supplier accepts to be paid a price below 
ca. Furthermore, if cs <  c^-h, or s =  S  (so 9 > K s - i ), supplier 3 will price 
above with probability 1 and hence suppliers i  <  s will not accept to be 
paid prices equal to ca either. Consequently, K s - 1  is an upper bound for
Lastly, we observe that mini<s =  K s- \  if ks =  maxj<s (or
ka > maxi<a ki), in which case we must have 9a =  9S . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
We start by showing that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist in 
either auction format. To see this, note first that in a pure-strategy equi­
librium all effective offer prices (he., offers that with positive probability 
affect the prices suppliers are paid) must be equal; if not, some supplier 
could profitably increase his offer price towards the next higher bid, thereby 
increasing profits in the event that this offer is effective without reducing 
output in any event. Next, observe that this common price cannot exceed 
c; if it did, some supplier could profitably deviate to a slightly lower price, 
thereby increasing the expected quantity despatched with only a negligible 
effect on the expected price. Lastly, bidding at c cannot constitute an equi­
librium either, since the supplier with costs equal to  c could obtain positive 
profits in the event that demand exceeds the capacity of his rival by raising 
his offer price.
We next characterize the unique equilibrium for each auction format.
Uniform auction
Let i ? ( i )  =  Pr {bi < 6} denote the equilibrium mixed-strategy of sup­
plier i, i =  1,2, in the uniform auction, with ff{b)  =  F^(b), and let S f
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be the support of F “. Standard arguments imply that SfC\ S% ~  [P\P) ,  
bu >  e, and that F± and Fg do not have mass points on (&u, P).
We focus on the case in which 0 <  rnin{fci, <  max { k\ , } < 9.
Supplier i ’s profit, when bidding b, may then be written
<(&) -  Fj(b) f  [ b - a W e - k ^ d G i e )
J kj
+  [ P [b - a ]  9dG{9) +  [ d [ v - a ]  kidG 
J b  J e  J k i
(9)
The first term on the right-hand side represents supplier i ’s profits in the 
event that the rival bids below br in which case supplier i produces a positive 
quantity only when demand is above the capacity of the rival. The second 
term represents supplier i ’s profits in the event that the rival bids above 
K As given by the first element of this term^ supplier i will then serve 
all demand at his own price when his capacity is sufficient to satisfy all of 
demand. On the other hand, and as given by the second element, supplier 
i will produce at full capacity and receive a price determined by the rival’s 
bid in the event that demand exceeds his capacity.
On (feu, P), strategies must satisfy the following differential equations:
FJ(b) f  [0 -  kj] dG (6) +  [1 -  *7(6)] /* '  6dG (0)
Jkj J6_
//(&>! [ k' e d G ( 9 ) +  1° M G ( 0 > -  1° \6 ~ k j\d G {9 )  1 = 0
1/0 Jki Jkj J
On the interior of the support of the mixed strategies the net gain from 
raising the bid marginally must be zero. The first element on the left-hand 
side represents the gain to a supplier from the resulting increase in the price 
received in the event that demand exceeds the capacity of the rival and 
the rival bids below. The second element represents the gain to a supplier
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from the resulting increase in the price in the event that demand is lower 
than his capacity and the rival bids above. Lastly, the third term represents 
the loss from being despatched with a smaller output: in case demand falls 
below the supplier’s capacity the loss of output equals total demand; in 
case demand exceeds the supplier’s capacity the loss equals the difference 
between being despatched at full capacity and serving residual demand only 




£ { 0 - k j } d G ( 0 ) - £ 0 d G ( 0 )
t f e d G  (0) -  £  [0 -  h] dG (0) -  £  [0 -  kj] dG (0) 
£ ‘ 0dG(0)
£  0dG (0) -  £  \0 -  h] dG m  -  £  [0 -  **] dG (0) 
which have solutions
F“f M = /  +  l for - \ > = °
iK 1 1 n j [ k -  cj]A> -  f i  for Xj £  0
where j — 1,2, are constants of integration. Note that, if ki < kj,
Pi >  Pj- Furthermore, p± =  P% afld Ai =■ A2 when k\ =  &2 - Also, if ki < kj, 
Pj—> 0  as 6 |  ki while Pj+  A^  —> 0  as 8 [ kj.
Given the boundary condition F^Qp) =  0, these equations yield the 
mixed-strategy distribution functions for b G \bu,P):
f t  In f e )  for A ,= 0 ,
1}  o-
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Suppose limifp Fj*(b) <  lim*|p F^(b) — 1 (in the opposite case, i.e. when 
lim i|p (b) <  limtfp J^(&) — 1 , a corresponding argument can he applied). 
Then it is straightforward to verify that bn is given uniquely as
 ^ C2 +  [P -  0 2 ] e  ^ for Ai =  0,
C 2 + [ P ~  C2] *1 for Ai 7^  0 .
Substituting for ba, we find
l  +  A l n t e )  for Ai =  0,
Fl (5) = { t  -  J} for °>
while F£ (P ) — 1 and, for b £ [bu, P ),




_ [p-<aJ [ xi j^sr] ^ +C2_ci_
As
- I
for Ai =  A2 =  0 , 
for Ai, As 7  ^0 .
Equilibrium profits become
1 — [P — ci] |  Pr (&2 <  F) /  [ 6 - k 2}dG{e) +  P i{b 2 =  P) f  min {6, h )  dG (6)
J b i J ±
* 2  =  [*>-<*] f $ [ e - k J]dG(9),
J  Jbl
where
P r(6 a < P )  =  B m l ^ ( 6 ) .
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Symmetric Capacities: When ki =  k% =  k and 0 =  ci <  C2  =  c, one can 
show that we must have l i m <  lim i^-p F “(i>) — 1 and so we find
c +  [P — c] e ~ & for A =  0 
bu = I  r « i 1
for A =  0
* 2 (6 ) =
0 1 n for A =  0
- 1 > for A. ^ 0
, 6 6 [ 6 “,P) ,
; 1  , b  =  P
where
A =
j f [g -f t ]rfG(g)- />rfG(g)




tt? =  P  jp r  (6 2  <  P) £  [0 ~  A;] dG (0) +  Pr (b2 =  P) £  min (0, k) dG (9) | , 
vrj =  [P -  c] — *] ciG? (^) .
J k
Consequently, at equilibrium the low-cost supplier bids more aggres­
sively than the high-cast supplier;, in particular,. the strategy of the low-cost
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supplier stochastically first-order dominates the strategy of the high-cost 
supplier.
Again, j3 —*- 0 (while X 0) as 6 f k. In particular,








limTr? =  Pk,
£T k
=  [ P - e ] [ E 0 - f c ] ,ujk
where we have used the fact that lim&\kjk^dG(6i) =E&. Consequently, 
as the probability that demand falls below the capacity of an individual 
supplier goes to zero, equilibrium approaches something with the flavour 
of the equilibrium found for high-demand realizations, with the high-cost 
supplier bidding at P  and the low-cost supplier mixing over a range between 
c and P  so as to make undercutting by the high-cost supplier unprofitable.
Also, /3 - > 1 and X > 1 as 9 |  k. In particular,
lim =  c,
=  1
Oik
-  1 ~  fe < P  
eik o
lim tt“ == cE0 
eik
=  0 ,
eik
where we have used the fact that lim ^fc MG (&) =  E0. Consequently, 
as the probability that demand exceeds the capacity of an individual sup­
plier goes to zero, equilibrium approaches something with the flavour of the
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Bertrand-like equilibrium found for low-demand realizations, with the low- 
cost supplier bidding at the cost of the high-cost supplier and the high-cost 
supplier mixing between c and P  (with a mass point at P).
Symmetric costs: When c\ =  C2  — 0 and k\ <  k%, we again must have 




for Ai =  0  
for Ai 7  ^ 0
f 1 +  Pi In (4 )  for Ai — 0
F “ {b) =  I &  { [ f t *1 - 1] }  for *  * 0
p 2fo i —=r
Pe?T
for Ai =  A2 — 0
Sx fra Ai,A2 ^ 0
1 , b  =  P  \  1
,6 e fe “,-P)
n't =  P  / p r  (b-2 <  P) j °  [ 8 - k 2}dG{e) +  Fi(b2  =  P )  (f>, fci)dG(0 ) j ,
n \  =  P  f  [6 -  *1] dG (6).
Jk\
Consequently, at equilibrium the smaller supplier bids more aggressively 
than the larger supplier;, in particular,, the strategy of the smaller supplier 
stochastically first-order dominates the strategy of the larger supplier.
In the limit,
b <  P
lim 7Tj =  Pk\
T^fei
limvrJ =  P [ E 0 - f c i ] ,
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where we have used the fact that 9dG (9) —E<9. Consequently, as
the probability- that denrarrd falls below the capacity- o f the smaller supplier 
goes to zero, equilibrium approaches something with the flavour of the high- 
low bidding equilibrium found for high-demand realizations, with the larger 
supplier bidding at P  and the smaller supplier mixing over a range below P  
so as to make undercutting by the larger supplier unprofitable.
Symmetric costs and capacities: When k\ — k% =  k and c\ — C2  — 0, we 
have Fi{b) =  Fg(b). and so we find
bu =
Pe 0 for A =  0
j A for A ^  0
f l  +  0 1 n ( 4 )  for A =  0
=  for
r§
r f= ir %  =  P  /  [i9 - k ] d G { 9 ) .
J k
Discriminatory auction
Let Ff{b) =  Pr {6* <  b} denote the equilibrium mixed-strategy of sup­
plier i, i =  1,2, in the discriminatory auction, and let S f  be the support 
of F f  and ff(b)  its density function. Standard arguments imply that S fn  
S d — [bd, P ) , bd >  e, and that F d and F d do not have mass points on
ft'.-p)-
Again we focus on the case in which 9 <  min (fci, < max {fci, < 6 .
Supplier i ’s profit, when bidding b, may then be written
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A necessary condition for supplier i  to be indifferent between any price 
in S d is that, for all b £ S d, nf(b) — wf, implying
F«(b) =  —  i °-M G  (9) ~ 5 °k' {9~ h] dG (9) ~ ^
f-e 7T“_
Ci
J l $ d G  ( 0 )  -  £  [0 -  k t ] d G  ( 0 )  ~  £  [$  -  k j ]  d G  ( 0 )
Observe that the boundary condition F d(bd) =  0 implies
—d  _  7T.- = id2 f  6 d G  {&) — I  \ e ~ k i ] d G { e )  
.ie_ S k i
and. so
= ~3
£ 0 d G ( 0 ) - £ [ 0 - H d G ( 0 ) b - b °
£  0 d G  (8 ) -  £  [0 -  k t ]  d G  (9) -  £  [0 -  fc,-] d G  ( 0 ) b — Ci
We have
^  ^  f l  0 d G  ( 0 )  -  f l  \ 0  -  fc j d G  ( 0 )  
b - < *  <  j f 0 d G { 0 ) - £ [ e - k 2} d G ( 6 )
Suppose Ff(b) >  Fd{b) (in the opposite case a corresponding argument to  
the following may be applied). Then we cannot have lim^ p  F d{b) =  1 since 
this would imply lim^p F d{b) >  1 . Consequently, we have the boundary 
condition lim^p Fd(P) =  1, which implies
e&




and, together with the condition F f(lf )  =  0,
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6  =  C2 +  [P -  C2] - 3
£ & j G ( B ) - j £ [ e - i * ] - d G c e )
Equilibrium profits become
1 “  [P — ci] s Pr (62 < P ) /  [B-fc2]dG(B) + Pr(62 =  P) /  min(0 ,k i )d G ( 0 ) 
1^ ifcs i f
^  =  [ P - c a ]  f  [0 — ki] dG (ff) ,
Jki
where
( I e d G  ( 6 )  -  / ?  [0 -  Si] d G  ( 6 )
Pr (62  <  P ) =  lim Fo <b) =  4 — ^ ------- !-----— .6tP P -  ci j |  edG {e) _ [e. _ fc2j ^  m.
Symmetric capacities: When ki — fa — k and 0 =■ ci < C2 =  c, Fi(b) >
(6 ) and so we find
6d =  c +  [P — c] -  ---------
/ ; 0 dG (0 ) - / te [ e - S ] ( i G ( 0 )
»i  =  [P -  c] i  [0 - fc ]d G (0 )  +  c | j f  0dG(<9) +  J  kdG(0)
7T^ =  [ P - - c ] 7  [ 0 - A]dG(0).
Jk
Consequently, at equilibrium the low-cost supplier bids more aggressively 
than the high-cost supplier; in particular, the strategy o£ the low-cost sup­
plier first-order stochastically dominates that of the high-cost supplier.
In the limit, we find
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Consequently, when the probability that demand falls below the capacity 
of any individual supplier goes to zeror equilibrium approaches the mixed- 
strategy equilibrium for high-demand realizations.
Furthermore,
lim&d =  c, 
eik
eik
ljmF2i (f>) =  {  1 f: 
0 1 *  I .  o  —
lim 7rf =  cE0, 
eik
lim 7ro =  0 . 
91 k 2
b < P  
=  P
Hence, as the probability that demand exceeds the capacity of an indi­
vidual supplier goes to zero, equilibrium approaches the Bertrand-like equi­
librium for low-demand realizations, with the low-cost supplier bidding at 
the cost of the high-cost supplier and the high-cost supplier mixing between 
c and P  (with a mass point at P)...
Symmetric costs-. When cj. =  ci — 0 and k\ < &2 , F f (b) >  F^ib) and so
k<t r  J l i e - k 1]dG(e)
S f 6 d G ( e ) - s l { e - k 2}dG{e)
4 - p
^  \ ‘i; n  k y , i ^ » :
7T$ = P  t  \&-kl)dG{& )  
J k 1
In the limit,
j E d — k\
lim bd =  P  =-------- -----------
ejkt E e - f ? [ 0 - k 2} d G ( 8 )
iVh h - t i j e - k d d G i e )  b
d
limJ#(6) =  < k i - J ^ i e - ^ d G i e )  b
m   ^ j. , 6  =  p
Urn 7Ti  =  P  [E9 -  f c ]  -------------
fiTti m -  f l 2 { e ~ k 2\dG{d)
lim 7rf =  F[E0 -  fci]fr\k\
Again, when the probability that demand falls below the capacity of any 
individual, supplier goes to zero, equilibrium approaches the mixed^-strategy 
equilibrium for high-demand realizations.
Furthermore,
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j ?  [9 -  *l] d G  ( e )
lim bd =  P ^ 1-------  —
01*2 E 0
v Ef) b - l fhm. Fx Cb) = --------- r-------------------------:—
er*i E 9  -  f g  [6 -  Ai] d G  ( 6 )  h
l im ^ ( 6 ) = {  ^  ’ b < p
2T* 1 , b =  P
. /•*» E0 -  17 [9 -  fci] dG (0)
lim 74  =  P  I \B ~ U d G  (8 )  J t l ‘ ■ ----- —
O IM  J k  i  ^
f iin ir f  =  P  [ k2 [0 -  k i ] d G ( 0 )
Oik2 J k i
Consequently, as the probability that demand exceeds the capacity of 
the larger supplier goes to zero, equilibrium approaches the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium for high-demand realizations, with the smaller supplier bidding 
more aggressively.
Symmetric capacities and costs: When k± =  &2 =  k and ci =  C2 =  0, 
Ff(b) =  Fij; (b) and so we find
_ Sl\9-k\dG{0)
f “ g d G ( 8 ) - ^ [ 8 - k } d G ( 8 )
/> r fG  ( « ) - / > -  k]dG(0)$ 1 0dG(0) -  2 / f  [0 - k) dG{0)
rd
7rf =  74  =  P  [(9 - k ) d G ( 0 ).
J k
Q.E.D.
P ro o f o f  P roposition  4.6
Uniform auction format: With, short-lived bids total payments to suppli­
ers equal zero for low-demand realizations and P0  for high-demand realiza­
tions, and so overall expected payments equal E K f =  P E  {& | 0 >  k}  G (k). 
With long-lived bids, for given demand realization 0, total payments equal
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2P  max { 0 — k, 0}, and so in expected terms we have E R f — 2P  [1? {£ | 9 > k} — k]G (k). 
From these expressions we find
E R f -  E R f  =  P [E  {9 t 9 > k} -  2 k}G(k)  <  0,
Discriminatory auction format: With short-lived bids total payments 
to suppliers equal, zero for low-demand realizations and 2 P  \6 — A:]for high- 
demand realizations, and so overall expected payments equal
ER% — 2P  [F {9 | 9 >  A;} — A;] G (k). With long-lived bids, for given de­
mand realization 9, total payments equal 2P max { 9 —k: 0}, and so in ex­
pected terms we have E R f  =  2P  [E {9 \ 9 >  k} — k)G (k) =  E R f . Q.E.D.
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